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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 5
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The present study aims at discovering the key political economy deter-
minants of inter-industry differences in the level of ad valorem tariff
rates in Russia since the beginning of trade policy reforms. Numerous
studies of this sort have been performed in the last three decades with
respect to the experience of a wide range of industrial and developing
countries. However, until now we had no such studies for post-
communist Russia. The principal novelty of this study consists in a year-
by-year tracing of the influence exercised by political economy factors.
This procedure contributes not only to visualizing the political economy
mechanisms determining the structure of import tariffs, but also to ex-
plaining the evolution of these mechanisms during the period
1992–1997 when Russia experienced frequent and intensive changes in
tariff structure.
The modern political economy approach to foreign trade regulation re-
lies on the modeling of government policy formation in terms of market-
like interactions among voters, pressure groups, and politicians & bu-
reaucrats. We tested four hypotheses based on this approach (and,
more particularly, on endogenous protection theory) as possible expla-
nations of the tariff structure in Russia.
• The pressure group hypothesis attaches the principal role to the de-
mand for protection by the producers of import-competing goods. It is
supposed that the intensity of lobbying for higher import barriers de-
pends, on the one hand, on the market situation for a particular com-
modity (i.e., on the dynamics of output, import penetration, etc.), and,
on the other hand, on the opportunities for domestic producers to over-
come the free rider problem and to organize an effective pressure
group.
• The stagnant industry support hypothesis emphasizes the interest of
the government in alleviating the structural and social consequences of
the radical intensification of import competition that otherwise can pro-
voke a crisis in import-competing industries. In the Russian case, this
hypothesis is related to the minimization of the social costs associated
with foreign trade liberalization.
• The liberalization hypothesis is based on the assumption that gov-
ernment officials are inclined to protect only those industries that have a
competitive structure, because only in this case may the comparative
costs of national and foreign producers be correctly estimated and the
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TARIFF PROTECTION6
real need for protection be determined. Additional assumptions on the
nature of the interaction with international institutions and on the role of
fiscal considerations have also been made.
• The foreign repercussions hypothesis links the expected tariff levels
with the possible reaction by countries whose residents export their
produce to Russia and/or make direct investments on its territory. The
key element here is the possibility of imposition of external economic
sanctions in response to domestic policies that harm the citizens of
other countries.
In our study, we use nominal rates of ad valorem tariffs and ad valorem
components of compound tariffs as the dependent variables. Independ-
ent variables include commodity market variables characterizing the
situation on Russian markets for individual tariff-protected product types
as well as sectoral variables intended to take into account some impor-
tant factors that characterize the general state of business activity in
closely connected production spheres.
Four types of tests were made to evaluate the relative performance of
the hypotheses under consideration: (1) test of single regression mod-
els that include all independent variables; (2) test of individual hypothe-
ses, where only those independent variables were included in the re-
gression models that are considered to be relevant to the particular
hypotheses; (3) construction of "ideal" regression models that provide
the best approximation of the relations between the independent and
the dependent variables for each particular year; and, (4) construction
of "ideal" regression models (based on panel analysis techniques) for
the entire period under consideration.
The results of our study indicate the existence of a relatively stable po-
litical economy mechanism. Its main features can be described by the
synthetic "stagnant industries – tariff revenues" hypothesis according to
which government policy provides both support for the stagnant indus-
tries and additional revenues to the budget. It is important to note that
the share of variance in protection rates explained by our models is
much larger than in most studies of this sort performed with respect to
Western countries. This finding can be interpreted as evidence for the
much more important role played by political economy forces in Russia.
In fact, this is what is to be expected due to the absence of "historical
levels of protection" that exercise an influence on the structure of tariff
rates in stable market economies.
The lack of evidence for the pressure group hypothesis is likely to be
accounted for by the transitional nature of the Russian economy, with its
abundance of firm-specific methods of rent-seeking (lobbying for subsi-
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dies, tax write-offs, and so on) that do not require inter-firm coopera-
tion. In this sense, tariff regulation in Russia is unlikely to serve as an
important source of policy-induced disproportions that typically are as-
sociated with rent-seeking activity.
At the same time, it can be expected that the "stagnant industries – tar-
iff revenues" mechanism that accounts now for the relatively high tariff
levels in particular industries will contribute to lowering tariff rates with
further developments of economic transformation. On the one hand, the
microeconomic adjustment and the exit of less-efficient firms from stag-
nant import-competing industries will decrease the number of loss-
making enterprises as well as the number of workers employed in these
industries. As a result, the decline in the absolute size of stagnant in-
dustries would potentially lead to a decrease in the level of protection,
and thus broaden the scope of economically efficient import operations.
On the other hand, macroeconomic adjustment accompanied by sound
budget policies should lead to the alleviation of the revenue problem,
making tariff receipts less important for the government. In this sense,
wide-scale trade liberalization will likely be an endogenous product of
successful micro- and macroeconomic adjustment rather than being the
result of exogenous efforts by "benevolent" politicians or political advis-
ers.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Foreign trade liberalization and the transformation of regulatory mecha-
nisms in Russia since 1992 have combined to form an entirely new en-
vironment for government management of export–import flows. The ne-
cessity to develop a long-term foreign trade strategy aimed at the
effective integration of Russia into the system of international economic
relations makes it crucial to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the
emerging mechanisms of foreign trade regulation. In the situation of se-
vere output declines, one of the most important problems with respect
to foreign trade consists in the determination of the protection levels
enjoyed by national industries against import competition. Support for
specific industries in the form of government regulation of imports can
prevent an effective market allocation of both consumer goods and pro-
ductive resources. At the same time, however, protection can cushion
the social costs associated with the contraction of industries with a low
level of international competitiveness. The existence of substantial inter-
industry differences in import protection levels calls forth the need to
identify the factors that affect the attitudes of government officials to-
wards granting protection to producers of specific traded goods.
In this context, principal importance is attached to the following ques-
tion: what is the degree of government autonomy in formulating protec-
tion policy, on the one hand, and the degree of policy dependence on
the preferences of organized lobbying groups and the constraints im-
posed by interactions with foreign companies and international organi-
zations, on the other? In an attempt to answer this question, we will util-
ize the political economy approach to government regulation and, more
specifically, undertake an empirical study based on hypotheses devel-
oped within endogenous protection theory.
The present study aims at uncovering the key political economy deter-
minants of the industrial protection structure in contemporary Russia. A
regression analysis is employed to find out how the levels of ad valorem
tariff rates for different traded goods depend on variables which reflect
the potential political economy determinants of inter-industry differences
in protection levels. Numerous studies of this sort have been performed
by Western economists with respect to the experience of individual
countries — such as the USA (see, e.g., Lavergne, 1983; Baldwin,
1985), Canada (Caves, 1976; Helleiner, 1977), and Australia (Anderson,
1980) — as well as a wide range of industrial and developing countries
(e.g., Anderson and Baldwin, 1987; Ollareaga and Soloaga, 1998).
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However, until now we have no such studies for Russia. The principal
novelty of our study consists, first, in a year-by-year (for the period
1993–1997) tracing of the influence exercised by political economy
factors. This procedure can contribute not only to visualizing the political
economy mechanisms determining the structure of import tariffs, but
also to explaining the evolution of these mechanisms. The study of such
an evolution is made possible by the fact that during the period under
consideration import tariffs were subject to deep and frequent revisions.
Formal rules limiting government discretion in this sphere were absent
until October 1997 (see Section 2). Thus, in 1992–1997 the government
enjoyed substantial freedom to formulate import regulation policies so
that constraints on its responsiveness to political economy incentives
were quite limited.
Another important aspect of the study consists in analyzing the specific
features of tariff rate determination in a transitional economic system. In
particular, two of the hypotheses that are examined are deliberately de-
signed to depict some peculiarities of economic liberalization; two other
hypotheses are formulated in such a way as to take into account the
expected impact of factors related to the transition process.
The results of the study allow us to identify a set of factors that play the
key role in determining government decisions on the levels of tariff pro-
tection granted to Russian producers. The identification of these factors
can provide an improved understanding of import regulation mecha-
nisms and their evolution during the period of economic transformation.
Such an investigation has a number of important theoretical and practi-
cal aspects.
First, our analysis makes it possible to compare the political economy
mechanisms that have emerged in Russia with the similar mechanisms
described by Western specialists studying experiences with import
regulation in stable market economies. As a consequence, the study
could shed light on specific features of government regulation in
economies in transition.
Second, factors could be identified that create obstacles to effective
foreign trade liberalization in Russia as well as those that generate sub-
stantial differences in the protection of different industries and can lead
to structural disproportions in the allocation of economic resources. The
determination of these factors and opportunities to offset them form
part and parcel of liberal foreign trade reforms, especially in connection
with Russia’s expected accession to the WTO.
Third, a basis could be provided for practical proposals related to the
recent problems in foreign trade regulation. The results of the study can
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serve as a guide to formulating recommendations for further modifica-
tion of the existing import regulation system in order to achieve the
strategic goals of foreign trade policy with as little political and institu-
tional friction as possible.
2. IMPORT REGULATION IN RUSSIA
DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD
The modern history of import regulation in Russia begins with Presiden-
tial decree No. 213, "On the Foreign Trade Liberalization in the Russian
Federation" (15 November 1991). According to this document, all import
barriers were abolished as of 1 January 1992. For eight months Russia
followed a policy of "complete import liberalization" and did not have
any legal basis for limiting the access of foreign goods to national mar-
kets. After this period of free importation, the Temporary Import Cus-
toms Tariff was adopted by Presidential decree No. 825 (7 August
1992). Under this decree, as of 1 September 1992, an uniform 15 per
cent ad valorem import tariff was applied to all commodity types except
spirits, beer and wine, television sets, videocameras, audio and video
tapes, and cars. (Tariffs for the latter commodity types were higher, with
the maximum level being 50 per cent.) At the same time, for some arti-
cles (medical equipment, food, children’s clothing, and printed matter)
the free importation regime was preserved.
On 1 April 1993 the Temporary Import Customs Tariff was replaced by
the detailed Import Customs Tariff that was characterized by substan-
tially more diversified tariff levels, with the maximum rate being 150 per
cent (for spirits). Like the Temporary Import Customs Tariff, the new Im-
port Customs Tariff fixed only ad valorem tariff rates (except for a spe-
cific tariff rate for cars imported by individuals).
Less than one year after the adoption of the Import Customs Tariff, the
tariff structure was completely revised by government resolution
No. 196, "On Fixing Import Tariff Rates" (10 March 1994). Major inno-
vations were (1) raising tariffs — from a level of zero — on food industry
products, (2) broadening the scope of specific tariffs (for food delica-
cies, apples, cocoa products), and (3) the introduction of compound
tariff rates for spirits and alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and cars.1 The
key reason for introducing compound tariff rates was to neutralize the
consequences of the artificial lowering of the declared customs value of
                                               
1 A standard way of stating compound tariffs through 1997 was "X per cent of
declared customs value, but not less than Y ECUs on 1 kilo (1 unit)".
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imports by Russian and foreign companies. In this sense, the specific (in
ECUs per physical unit) component of compound tariff rates served as a
supplemental device securing the full effect of ad valorem rates. (Fiscal
considerations also played their part). Though the maximum ad valorem
tariff rate was reduced from 150 per cent to 100 per cent, the tariff
structure of 1994 was on average more protectionist than that of 1993.
The next protectionist move in Russian import regulation policy was as-
sociated with government resolution No. 454 "On Fixing Import Tariff
Rates" (6 May 1995). The maximum ad valorem tariff rate was not
changed, but the number of commodity types for which compound rates
had to be applied was extended (with the ad valorem component of
compound rates being in many cases higher than the previous level of
the corresponding ad valorem rate), while the levels of ad valorem tariff
rates for a wide variety of commodity types were raised.
Unlike the period 1992–1995 when the tariff structure changed dramati-
cally every year, tariff revisions during 1996 were much more limited.
Nevertheless, they included a group of important modifications related
first of all to the tariff unification recommended by the IMF. Some com-
modity types for which a zero tariff rate was previously applied were de-
prived of zero-tariff status (government resolution No. 413, 11 April
1996); at the same time, the maximum ad valorem tariff rate was low-
ered to 30 per cent, with the only exception being alcoholic beverages
(government resolution No. 413 and also resolutions No. 998 and
No. 1105, 13 August and 19 September, respectively). Some other tariff
rates were also changed, with the principal modifications being of a
protectionist nature. One set of these modifications was associated with
the previously mentioned government resolution No. 413; another nota-
ble change was the increase in the tariff rate on chicken to 30 per cent
(government resolutions No. 84 and No. 556, 1 February and 1 May re-
spectively; an attempt to raise the chicken tariff to 35 per cent failed
due to intensive pressure exercised by the United States). Government
resolution No. 1560 "On the Commodity Classification Used in Foreign
Trade Operations, and on the Import Customs Tariff of the Russian Fed-
eration" (27 December 1996), which came into force on 1 January
1997, integrated all the revisions made during 1996 into the new Cus-
toms Tariff.
The general trend toward stabilization of the tariff structure was rein-
forced in 1997 by government resolution No. 1347 "On the Questions of
Customs and Tariff Policy" (22 October). This resolution established a
unified procedure, corresponding to WTO standards, for import tariff re-
visions. According to this resolution, revisions of tariff rates should not
be performed more often than once in 6 months and should come into
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force not sooner than 180 days after the publication of new tariff rates
in the official press (except for cases when new tariff rates are lower
than the previous ones). The resolution also prescribes that tariff levels
should not be raised by more than 10 per cent of customs value for ad
valorem tariffs and the equivalent absolute value for specific rates or
specific components of compound rates. The most important revision to
the tariff structure during 1997, enacted by government resolution
No. 1608 (19 December) on the level of compound tariff rates, strictly
followed these new rules.
The central feature of Russian import regulation history is that during
the entire period 1992–1997 tariffs played the principal role in protect-
ing Russian manufacturing against imports. Russia did not used the
various alternative instruments of import regulation that are common in
world practice. According to the agreement with the IMF, Russia should
not apply quantitative barriers to foreign trade. Moreover, there has
been no legislative basis for applying such instruments as antidumping
and countervailing duties, import licenses, etc. The federal law "On the
Customs Tariff of the Russian Federation" (adopted in 1995) did not
contain rules for the application of these non-tariff trade barriers. The
law "On the Measures Directed to the Protection of Economic Interests
of the Russian Federation in the Foreign Trade in Commodities", which
contains detailed rules concerning these measures and their application,
was adopted by both houses of the parliament only at the beginning of
1998, and was signed by the President on April 14. The previous version
of this law was approved by the parliament in 1996 but vetoed by the
President, because many of its provisions could have created serious
obstacles to Russia’s accession to the WTO.
Another important point to emphasize is that there was no "historical
level of protection" to influence the decisions of Russian authorities
concerning import regulation policy. Starting from the level of zero pro-
tection, the Russian tariff structure experienced radical changes during
1992–1995, with relative stabilization achieved only in 1996. This means
that the political economy factors that could provoke these develop-
ments were of a short-term nature, with the "adjustment period" (i.e.,
the period when the tariff structure adjusts to new political economy
conditions) probably not longer than one year.
Two conclusions follow from this observation. First, it is more likely that
the tariff levels rather than the changes in tariff levels should reflect the
impact of political economy factors. In the absence of a relevant "his-
torical level of protection", changes in tariff levels are not very mean-
ingful indicators unless we stipulate that the previous tariff levels were
themselves the equilibrium result of some constellation of political
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economy factors, so that the changes in tariff levels can reflect changes
in this specific constellation of factors. This line of reasoning, however,
brings us back to the task of tracing the impact of political economy
factors on tariff levels. Second, if the political economy factors that af-
fect tariff levels enacted in a particular year are in fact themselves af-
fected by the developments of tariff structure, these developments are
related to the policy decisions made earlier, such as the tariff levels in
the preceding year. Thus, an assumption about the unidirectional causal
influence of political economy factors on each year’s tariff structure
seems to be justified, and the study of their impact can be performed
with the standard regression technique (instead of simultaneous regres-
sion models).
However, we can not rule out the possibility that the political economy
factors are "endogenous" to the models for each particular year in the
sense of two-direction causal influence. This fact should be taken into
account during the interpretation of regression results. As far as the
factors of tariff changes are concerned, we will address this question
directly when testing specific regression models.
Table 1 below summarizes the key regulations fixing the import tariff
structure during the period 1992–1997. The last column shows the pe-
riod when political economy factors operated that have presumably de-
termined the tariff structure enacted by the respective regulation. There
is no reason to search for any political economy background for the
Temporary Import Customs Tariff (enacted on 7 August 1992) because
its very simplicity signifies that tariff levels were determined by a rule of
thumb to provide some protection for Russian producers during the pe-
riod before the detailed tariff structure was worked out. (Precisely this
reason for enacting the Temporary Import Customs Tariff was put for-
ward by government officials at the time.) Thus, our attention in the
econometric part of this study will be focused on the political economy
determinants of the tariff structure as fixed by the regulations 3–7 listed
in Table 1.
3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Modern political economy analysis of government regulation in general
and the regulation of imports in particular is based on the modeling of
government policy formation in terms of market-like interactions among
voters, pressure groups, and politicians & bureaucrats. This approach
makes it possible to consider government economic policy not as a
factor exogenous to the economic system but as a result of purposeful
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maximizing behavior by political market agents under the given institu-
tional constraints (Hettich and Winer, 1993). Government regulatory
policies are considered to be endogenous to the system embracing
economic markets (i.e., markets for commodities and services) as well
Table 1. Key Regulations Concerning the Tariff Protection Policy in Russia,
1992–1997.
No. Decision
taken
Decision
came into
force
Regulation Influence of
political econ-
omy factors
1 15 November
1991
1 January
1992
"On the Foreign Trade Liber-
alization in the Russian Fed-
eration"
(Presidential decree No. 213)
2 7 August
1992
1 September
1992
Temporary Import Customs
Tariff
(Presidential decree No.825)
3 15 March
1993
1 April 1993 Import Customs Tariff
(Presidential decree No. 340)
1991–1992
4 10 March
1994
15 March
1994
1 July 1994
(for some
rates)
"On Fixing Import Tariff
Rates"
(government resolution
No. 196)
1992–1993
5 6 May 1995 1 June 1995
10 May 1995
(for some
rates)
"On Fixing Import Tariff
Rates"
(government resolution
No. 454)
1993–1994
6 27 December
1996
1 January
1997
"On the Commodity Classifi-
cation Used in Foreign Trade
Operations, and on the Im-
port Customs Tariff of the
Russian Federation" (govern-
ment resolution No. 1560)
1995–1996
7 19 December
1997
1 February
1998
"On the Amendments to the
Structure of Import Tariff
Rates Enacted by Govern-
ment Resolution No. 1560,
27 December 1996"
(government resolution
No. 1608)
1996–1997
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as political markets, where special privileges for different categories of
economic agents are exchanged for their support in the form of votes,
electoral contributions, etc.
Endogenous protection theory based on this analytical scheme devotes
principal attention to the factors that determine the demand for protec-
tive policies by pressure groups and voters, on the one hand, and the
supply of these policies by politicians and bureaucrats, on the other
(see, in particular, Hillman, 1989; Mayer, 1984; Nelson, 1988). Factors
under consideration include (1) the economic efficiency of lobbying for
producers, which in turn depends on the comparative returns for their
economic and political activity; (2) opportunities for accumulation of re-
sources to perform lobbying, related first of all to the extent of the free
rider problem within a group of producers; (3) the sensitivity of consum-
ers (voters) to protection policies affecting their welfare; and (4)
autonomous motivations of politicians and bureaucrats unrelated to the
maximization of political support received from pressure groups and
voters.
There are two general approaches to trade policy determination in the
endogenous protection literature. The first one relies on probabilistic
voting models of the 2×2 type (two pressure groups, two political par-
ties). According to this approach, political parties announce trade policy
to maximize the electoral support provided by pressure groups, while
the members of these groups calculate optimal electoral contributions
so as to maximize the expected level of their incomes, given that politi-
cal markets clear more frequently than economic markets, i.e., the time
span between successive elections is less than that for economic mar-
kets to come to equilibrium (see, e.g., Magee et al., 1989, pp 54, 55).
Thus, every political party (e.g., party 1) maximizes
π1 = π1(C1, C2, t1, t2), (1)
where Ci = ΣCij(ti) is the volume of resources transferred to party i by
the pressure groups j (j=1,2), and ti is the trade policy variable (e.g., the
tariff rate) announced by party i. At the same time, every pressure
group (e.g., pressure group 1) maximizes
R1 = π1(C11, C12, C21, C22, t1, t2) × r11(C11, C21, t1) +
     + [1–π1(C11, C12, C21, C22, t1, t2)] × r21(C11, C21, t2) – (2)
     – C11 – C21,
where π1 is the probability that party 1 will win the forthcoming election,
Cij is the volume of resources transferred to party i by pressure group j,
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and ri1 is the revenue of members of pressure group 1 in the case when
party i wins the election.
A prominent feature of the probabilistic voting approach is that it leaves
almost no scope for governmental discretion in trade policy issues (the
so-called powerless politician effect), because under the conditions of
intensive political competition, the optimal strategy for each political
party consists in the precise balancing of the interests of the "sponsor"
pressure group and those of the voters whose welfare is also influenced
by trade policy. An alternative approach eliminates this deficiency by
admitting some degree of monopoly power for the ruling party in for-
mulating trade policy during the time period between elections (Gross-
man and Helpman, 1994). Enjoying this "monopoly" position, the gov-
ernment can formulate trade policy so as to choose the internal price
vector p = p(p1, p2, ..., pn) to maximize
G = Σ Cj (p) + a W (p), (3)
where ΣCj(p) is the volume of resources transferred to the government
by pressure groups j (j = 1, 2, ..., n), W(p) is the aggregate welfare of
the country’s citizens, and a is the relative weight ascribed by the gov-
ernment to the citizens’ welfare. Though the principal inducement of the
government to care for citizens’ welfare is related to its desire to attract
votes, the government can also follow some autonomous motives for
raising the welfare of the general population or particular social groups.
Thus, this approach allows us take into account not only an investment
motive underlying government behavior (i.e., the desire of the ruling
party to raise its chances for victory in the next elections) but also —
through the parameter a — a consumption motive related to the possi-
bility for the ruling party to realize its ideological preferences.2 Due to
this feature, the approach under consideration forms — implicitly or ex-
plicitly — the basis for numerous empirical studies applying endogenous
protection theory.
There is no universal agreement among specialists working in the field
of endogenous protection theory on the exact combination of factors
determining tariff levels in different industries. This theory, therefore,
does not allow us to put forward strict and unambiguous statements on
the relationship between industry characteristics and the potential for an
industry to receive protection against foreign competition (Trefler,
1993). But endogenous protection theory does make it possible to for-
                                               
2 The distinction between investment and consumption motives in political activity
was introduced by George Stigler; see Stigler (1972).
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mulate various (and sometimes conflicting) hypotheses designed to es-
timate the probability of alleviating import pressure by taking into ac-
count specific developments in the industries under consideration (see,
in particular, Finger, Hall and Nelson, 1982; Baldwin, 1982).
Two major questions addressed in empirical studies on endogenous
protection are concerned with the determinants of the tariff structure
(Pincus, 1975; Anderson and Baldwin, 1987, etc.) and the changes in
tariff levels due to major trade policy reforms (e.g., Baldwin, 1985). To
study both issues, a set of hypotheses has been put forward. Among
them, two hypotheses directly address the investment motive in trade
policy formation. The pressure group hypothesis focuses attention on
the problem of resource transfer from producers to the government,
whereas the adding machine hypothesis stresses the incentive for the
government to protect geographically dispersed industries with the larg-
est number of employees-voters (Caves, 1976). Alternative hypotheses
emphasize the consumption motive in government activity. They aim to
assess the interest of the political authorities in achieving such policy
targets (not related or only indirectly related to political support maximi-
zation) as protecting stagnant industries and/or industries that employ a
large number of low-income workers, minimizing short-term adjustment
costs for industries suffering from an unexpected shock in world prices
(in some sense, preserving the economic status quo), interacting with
foreign governments on trade policy issues, and so on.
Strictly speaking, hypotheses of the "consumption" nature resemble
models of activist and autonomous government rather than the more
traditional political economy models of market-like political interactions.
In the theoretical literature, there is a pronounced tendency to expand
the pressure group hypothesis to analyze problems that are otherwise
addressed in "consumption"-type hypotheses. This approach is inten-
sively applied to study the protection of senescent (stagnant) industries
(Hillman, 1982; Cassing and Hillman, 1986), the impact of the interna-
tionalization process on the foreign trade regime (Hillman and Ursprung,
1988), etc. In this connection, comparative testing of "investment"-type
and "consumption"-type hypotheses in empirical studies can provide
valuable information on the degree of government autonomy as well as
lend assistance to estimating the adequacy of the extended "invest-
ment" framework.
The analytical approaches developed within endogenous protection the-
ory provide useful guidelines for the explanation of different phenomena
in the sphere of import regulation. A special emphasis on the role of
quantitative characteristics of industrial activity and commodity markets
in the studies of this sort enables us to put forward some empirically
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verifiable hypotheses on the determinants of the tariff structure in Rus-
sia. Four such hypotheses are the focus of our study.
4. HYPOTHESES AND VARIABLES
4.1. Hypotheses to be Tested
For the analysis of import policy determination in Russia during the tran-
sition period, two hypotheses characteristic of empirical studies on en-
dogenous protection theory are of principal interest.
• The pressure group hypothesis attaches the key role to the demand
for protection by the producers of import-competing goods (Pincus,
1975; Hansen, 1990). It is stipulated that the intensity of lobbying for
higher import barriers depends, on the one hand, on the market situa-
tion for a particular commodity (i.e., on the dynamics of output, prices,
and import penetration), and, on the other hand, on the opportunities
for domestic producers to overcome the free-rider problem and to or-
ganize an effective pressure group.
• The stagnant industry support hypothesis emphasizes the interest of
the government in alleviating structural and social consequences of the
radical intensification of import competition (induced, e.g., by the de-
cline in world prices or import liberalization) that otherwise can provoke
a crisis in import-competing industries. According to the hypothesis,
tariff levels should be higher the more intensive the competition be-
tween national and imported products and the worse the situation in im-
port-competing industries. In the Russian case, this hypothesis has
much in common with the status quo hypothesis that prescribes the
minimization of the social costs associated with changing the foreign
competition regime (Lavergne, 1983).
At the same time, it seems important to consider two hypotheses de-
signed to reflect the specific features of the ongoing transformation
process in the Russian economy.
• The liberalization hypothesis is based on the assumption that gov-
ernment officials are inclined to protect only those industries that have a
competitive structure, because only in this case may the comparative
costs of national and foreign producers be correctly estimated and the
real need for protection be determined. In this context, the expected
tariff levels should depend on the degree of industry market liberaliza-
tion, being negatively related to industrial concentration and the degree
of government control over production through the exercise of property
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rights over enterprises. The interaction with international institutions like
the IMF should also be taken into account since their recommendations
play an important role in shaping liberalization policy in Russia.
• The foreign repercussions hypothesis links the expected tariff levels
with the possible reaction by countries whose residents export their
produce to Russia and/or make direct investments on its territory. The
key element here is the possibility of imposition of external economic
sanctions in response to domestic policies that harm the citizens of
other countries, be they exporters or investors (cf. Helleiner, 1977). It
should be expected that the foreign repercussions factor is especially
important for economies in transition because adverse foreign reaction
can undermine the international credibility of a reformist government
and serve as a hindrance to the integration of the country into the world
economic system. (On special problems faced by transition economies
as far as foreign barriers to their exports are concerned, see Ehrenhaft
et al., 1997.)3
To present a more detailed treatment of the hypotheses under consid-
eration, we need to introduce a list of independent variables that can be
expected to reflect the political economy factors relevant for the re-
spective hypotheses. In Section 4.2 we describe the variables to be
used for testing the hypotheses; in Section 4.3 we identify the expected
impact of independent variables on the level of tariff rates according to
each hypothesis. Finally, in Section 4.4 the choice of the dependent
variables (i.e., measures of tariff levels) is motivated and some problems
related to their use and interpretation in a political economy setting are
discussed.
4.2. Independent Variables
The independent variables are divided into two broad categories, com-
modity market variables and sectoral variables.
                                               
3 In the Russian case, we can expect that the foreign retaliation factor should be
most important for relations with the European Union. According to Article 16 of
the Russia-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed on June 24,
1994, the parties consented to hold consultations "on their import tariff policies,
including changes in import protection". Though this Agreement came into force
only in 1997, the main principles of the PCA were fixed in the Temporary Agree-
ment on Trade and Trade-Related Questions that operated since February 1996.
The necessity (or at least possibility) of tariff policy coordination with the principal
trade partner (the EU accounts for some 40 per cent of Russian official trade
turnover with non-CIS countries) could have served as an efficient check on ini-
tiatives threatening partner interests.
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Commodity market variables characterize the situation on Russian mar-
kets for tariff-protected product types. The following variables belong to
this category:
1) ∆Imp — rate of change in value of imports of a commodity as com-
pared with the preceding year (in per cent);
2) ∆Out — rate of change in physical volume of output as compared
with the preceding year (in per cent);
3) ShImp — share of imports in national consumption of a commodity
under consideration, in per cent (calculated according to the follow-
ing formula: ShImp = M*100/(V + M – E), where M is the physical
volume of imports, V is the physical volume of national production,
and E is the physical volume of exports);
4) ∆ShImp — rate of change in the share of imports in national con-
sumption as compared with the preceding year (in per cent);
5) ShExp — share of exports in physical volume of national output of a
commodity;
6) RExp — net export ratio (calculated according to the following for-
mula: RExp = (VE – VM)*100/(VE + VM), where VE is the value of
exports in US$, VM is the value of imports in US$);
7) ShImpI — share of imports of a given commodity in the total volume
of country’s imports (in per cent).
Sectoral variables are intended to take into account some important
factors that characterize the general state of business activity in closely
connected production spheres. As for the pressure group hypothesis,
sectoral variables describe the stimuli and opportunities for lobbying by
representatives of allied industries. As for the other three hypotheses,
these variables point to the possibility or necessity for granting protec-
tion to large sectors of the economy by increasing the tariff rates ap-
plied to their products. Eight industrial sectors are considered: fuel in-
dustry (subdivided into oil-extracting and oil-refining); ferrous metals;
nonferrous metals; chemical and oil-chemical industry; machine-building
and metal works; wood & paper; light industry; and, finally, food indus-
try. The following sectoral variables enter the study:
1) ∆Pri — rate of change in prices for raw and intermediate products
consumed by sectors as compared with the preceding year (in per
cent);
2) Emp — total employment in a sector;
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3) Wage — average wage rate in a sector as compared with the aver-
age wage rate in manufacturing as a whole (in per cent);
4) Prof — profitability of production (sum of profits as compared with
the sum of production costs of enterprises, in per cent);
5) Inv — creation of new production facilities (in per cent of existing
ones);
6) Loss — share of loss-making enterprises (in per cent);
7) Debt — share of enterprises’ debt in arrears in total liabilities to
suppliers (in per cent);
8) NEnt — number of enterprises in a sector;
9) Mon — number of enterprises holding monopoly position (according
to the official Register of Economic Subjects, an enterprise is con-
sidered to be a "monopolist" if it produces more than 35 per cent of
the total commodity output);
10) Sh4 — share of 4 largest producers in total output of a sector;
11) Stat — share of total output produced by enterprises fully or partially
owned by the state (included are enterprises classified by official
statistics as belonging to the "state property", "municipal property",
and "mixed property without foreign participation" groups);
12) ShIn — share of total output produced by enterprises with foreign
participation in property (included are enterprises classified by offi-
cial statistics as belonging to the "mixed property with foreign par-
ticipation" group);
13) InInv — share of foreign investments to a sector in the total volume
of foreign direct investments in manufacturing.
4.3. Expected Influence of Independent
Variables on Tariff Rates
• The pressure group hypothesis. It is assumed that the demand by
producers for import protection is higher in industries most affected by
competition from imported products. This effect can be captured by the
variables ∆Imp, ShImp, and ∆ShImp: the higher the value of these vari-
ables, the higher the stimuli to lobby for increased level of tariff rates.
We should also take into account the impact of the variable ∆Out: the
more intensive the output decline in an industry, the more intensive the
producers’ desire for protection, irrespective of the exact cause for the
output decline — whether it is increased import competition or a de-
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mand contraction on the domestic market. (On the impact of these vari-
ables, see, e.g., Ray, 1981; Baldwin, 1985.)
We can also expect to find a positive impact on the tariff level exercised
by the variable ∆Pri, and a negative impact by the variable Prof: the
higher the prices for material inputs and the lower the profitability of
production, the more desirable lobbying activity would seem to be as a
use for industry resources. Unfortunately, commodity-level information
to calculate these variables is unavailable, so we are forced to use the
corresponding sectoral variables.
Another important group of factors determines the opportunities for
producers to organize an effective pressure group to lobby for raising
tariff rates. Key importance is assigned here to overcoming the free
rider problem. The intensity of the free rider problem is expected to be
positively related to the number of producers and negatively related to
the market share of the largest firms.4 For testing this assumption, at-
tention is usually paid to variables characterizing the number of produc-
ers of a given commodity and the market share of 4 (or 8) leading pro-
ducers, but the data limitations prevent us from using these variables at
the commodity market level. Available statistics do not allow us to trace
the number of enterprises producing individual commodities on the
year-by-year basis. Thus, we will use the variables NEnt and Sh4, which
characterize the potential for overcoming the free rider problem at the
sectoral level. Such an approach is reasonable because, due to the
wide variety of goods produced by enterprises, producers might be in-
terested in forming sectoral coalitions to lobby for increased tariff rates
on most commodities produced in an industry.5 For similar reasons we
include in the set of independent variables the variable Mon, character-
izing the number of "enterprises holding a monopoly position" in each
of 8 sectors. Note, however, that commodities produced under an en-
terprise’s "monopoly position" typically constitute only a limited share of
the total output of the enterprise (in 1997, from 49.5 per cent of output
in the machine-building and metal works industry to only 7.8 per cent in
the light industry and 3.9 per cent in the fuel industry). These enter-
                                               
4 The principal contribution on the role of the free rider problem for the relative
success of pressure groups in affecting economic policy formation is Becker
(1983). The now universally accepted view on the relationship between the num-
ber and size of pressure group members, on the one hand, and the degree of
the free rider problem, on the other, was introduced by Mancur Olson in his
seminal work The Logic of Collective Action: Olson (1965).
5 In fact, there are widespread discussions in Russia on the role of the "metallur-
gical lobby", the "machine-building lobby", etc. in political decision-making.
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prises, having special advantages in lobbying for increased tariffs on
their "monopoly" products, presumably can use established contacts
with political decision-makers to lobby for tariff increases on other types
of their output.
Contacts between producers and the government can also depend on
the degree of governmental control over the enterprises. To test this
proposition, we use the variable Stat, denoting the share of total secto-
ral output produced by enterprises with state participation in property.
According to the pressure group hypothesis, this variable should be
positively linked to the level of import tariffs.
Total employment in a sector could serve as a useful guide for estimat-
ing pressure group resource potential since the government can be in-
terested in maximizing electoral support. Official statistics do not provide
data on the employment in production of individual commodities, so we
once again are forced to use a sectoral variable, Emp.
Foreign companies have in recent years become important actors in the
Russian economy. The potential effect of their activity, therefore, should
also be taken into account. As far as the pressure group hypothesis is
concerned, there are two reasons to expect that a foreign presence on
the market will contribute to lowering tariff rates. First, even if foreign in-
vestors are interested in protection (for raising prices on articles pro-
duced in Russia and thus their profits from sales in this country), their
entry into the market can aggravate the free rider problem more than
the entry of Russian companies with the same volume of sales (Hillman
and Ursprung, 1988). Due to the diversity of interests of domestic pro-
ducers and foreign investors, a pressure group with the participation of
foreign companies can be much more difficult to form than a pressure
group consisting entirely of national firms. Second, one of the motives
for foreign companies to invest in Russia could be the desire to coun-
teract protectionist tendencies in Russian trade policy. By establishing
production lines in Russia, foreign companies can gain a more favorable
attitude from officials concerning their imports to Russia and thus de-
fuse the threat of higher tariffs (along the lines predicted by the quid
pro quo theory of foreign investment; see Bhagwati, 1987; Dinopoulos,
1992). On these grounds we can expect to find a negative impact from
the sectoral variables ShIn and InInv on tariff levels. (Here it would be
preferable to use the corresponding commodity market variables but
information for calculating them is not available in Russian statistics).
• The stagnant industry support hypothesis. The interest of the gov-
ernment in alleviating the burden of losses placed on national producers
by foreign trade liberalization can be taken into account by the variables
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∆Imp, ∆Out, ShImp, and ∆ShImp. It can be supposed that their impact
on tariff levels is analogous to that described in the pressure group hy-
pothesis. However, in this instance these variables serve not to reflect
the lobbying stimuli for pressure groups, but rather to identify signals
informing the government that production of certain commodities needs
to be protected if it is to be maintained. Along with these four variables,
we should consider the following sectoral variables: Emp (the higher the
employment in a sector, the more intensive could be the government’s
desire to provide protection for production in this sector6); Wage, Prof,
and Inv (the lower the levels of wages, profits and investment in a sec-
tor, the more urgent its need for support); and also Loss and Debt (the
share of loss-making enterprises in a sector and the share of debt in
arrears can be interpreted by the government as signs of an unfavorable
situation that could be improved by special measures including raising
tariff rates).
• The liberalization hypothesis. Under the economy-in-transition re-
gime, a reformist government can take deliberate actions to create ef-
fective competition among national and foreign producers in order to
form an optimal structure of foreign trade specialization. In this case,
the variable ∆Imp can be positively associated with the level of tariff
rates only when the government is sure that comparative cost estimates
are meaningful. In empirical studies, the structure of comparative ad-
vantage is usually identified by the shares of exports in national output
(see, e.g., Baldwin, 1985). We propose to use for this purpose the vari-
able ShExp as well as the variable RExp that can also indicate the de-
gree of comparative competitiveness of different industries (the lower
this degree, the higher will be the expected level of tariff rates). For
these estimates of comparative advantages to be meaningful, an indus-
try should have a competitive structure. The impact of the variables Mon
and Sh4 on tariff levels should therefore be negative, and the impact of
the variable NEnt should be positive. Likewise, we can expect to find a
negative relationship between the level of tariff rates and the degree of
government control over enterprises operating in a sector (the variable
Stat) since state participation in ownership can be regarded as a factor
limiting the development of market forces. Providing support for sectors
with wide government control can also be interpreted by international
                                               
6 This factor can also indicate the interest of the government in mobilizing as
much voter support as possible, along the lines suggested by the adding ma-
chine hypothesis; see Section 3.
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organizations (such as the IMF and the World Bank) as a sign of reluc-
tance to carry out reforms in the public sector.
The role played by international agencies (and the IMF in particular) in
the transformation of the foreign trade regulation systems in transition
economies is an important factor to study. Apart from the elimination of
tariff exemptions (that are treated as a source of significant losses in
budget revenues), the IMF insists on greater tariff unification (first of all
by decreasing the number of tariff peaks) and lowering the weighted
average tariff rate by decreasing the maximal tariff rate and performing
widespread tariff cuts. In this respect, we can suppose that the govern-
ment can be inclined to fix low tariffs on commodities with the largest
percentage shares in total imports (ShImpI) so as to assure a low level
of the weighted average tariff rate while maintaining substantial freedom
to fix comparatively high tariffs on other commodity types. This strategy
also is compatible with the aim of lowering the weighted average tariff
rate as a step to Russia’s accession to the WTO.
But the opposite proposition (i.e., that the variable ShImpI is positively
related to the level of tariff rates) can also be plausible: fixing high tariffs
on commodities with a substantial share in total imports can maximize
tariff revenues and thus contribute to alleviating the continuing problem
of inadequate budget receipts. The revenue-maximizing aspect of tariff
policy is intensively stressed by trade theorists (see, e.g., the classical
analysis of this problem in Corden, 1974, ch.4). Revenue considerations
are also frequently mentioned in the endogenous protection literature as
explaining the preference given to tariffs as compared with other trade
policy instruments as well as the motive for raising tariff levels (Cony-
beare, 1983; Hillman, 1985).
Commodity types with a high share in the total value of imports have
two unambiguous advantages for imposition of high tariff rates on fis-
cal grounds. First, a given increase in a tariff rate provides more
budget receipts. Second, efficient monitoring of trade flows and the
collection of tariff charges is much easier to organize for those com-
modity types that are well known to customs officials. In other words,
an increase in the tariff rate for these commodities is associated with
lower losses in revenues due to administrative factors. Alternatively,
the collection of tariff charges on a wide range of commodities with
low shares in total imports — i.e., commodities not familiar to many
customs officials in terms of valuation, specification, etc. — can gener-
ate substantial administrative costs (as well as opportunities for vari-
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ous abuses) that make the fiscal effect of such tariffs negligible.7
Thus, we cannot make an unambiguous prediction about the direction
of the impact of the variable ShImpI on tariff rates under the liberaliza-
tion hypothesis.
• The foreign repercussions hypothesis. Here we use once again the
variable ∆Imp as an indicator of the existing need to protect national
producers against import competition. But the probability of a protec-
tionist response to the increase in imports under this hypothesis will be
lower the more intensive the penetration of foreign importers into the
domestic market (variables ShImp and ∆ShImp) and the higher the
share of a particular commodity in total imports (variable ShImpI), as far
as these variables reflect the involvement of foreign exporters on the
Russian market and their control over the total volume of transactions.
It is more difficult to take into account the interests of foreign investors.
On the one hand, they can be interested in fixing high tariffs on their
products to maximize profits from sales on the Russian market. On the
other hand, their principal aim can be to neutralize the threat of raising
tariffs on their exports to Russia (as explained in the discussion of the
pressure group hypothesis). Consequently we will regard the possibility
of either positive or negative effects of the variables ShIn and InInv on
levels of tariff rates under the foreign repercussions hypothesis. If for-
eign investors are interested in raising import barriers this impact is
positive; if foreign investments are motivated by the reasons suggested
by the quid pro quo theory, the impact is negative.
The degree of possible foreign repercussion (and thus the incentive for
the Russian government to abstain from measures that are at variance
with the interests of foreign exporters and investors) can be estimated
using the variable ShExp, because the share of exports in national pro-
duction can be supposed to be proportional to the potential losses as-
sociated with foreign sanctions against Russian exporters (cf. Anderson
and Baldwin, 1987). We can also take into account the variable RExp:
the higher the net export ratio, the higher are the chances that the gov-
ernment will not take measures that harm foreign companies and raise
the threat of sanctions against Russian exports.
                                               
7 It seems that in the case of Russia both of these factors make the variable
ShImpI more appropriate for capturing the revenue motive than other, more
elaborate, variables (e.g., related to the average weighted tariff rate). The aver-
age tariff level is more likely to be the ex post result of fixing nominal tariff rates
(and the adjustment of imports to the new protection level) than an ex ante de-
terminant of the tariff structure.
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The direction of the expected influence exercised by each independent
variable on the tariff levels is indicated in Table 2. The sign "+" denotes
a positive influence, while "–" denotes a negative influence.
Table 2. Independent Variables and Their Expected Impact on the Tariff Level.
Pressure
group hy-
pothesis
Stagnant in-
dustry support
hypothesis
Liberalization
hypothesis
Foreign reper-
cussions hy-
pothesis
Commodity
market vari-
ables:
∆Imp + + + +
∆Out – –
ShImp + + –
∆ShImp + + –
ShExp – –
RExp – –
ShImpI – (or) + –
Sectoral vari-
ables:
Pri +
Emp + +
Wage –
Prof – –
Inv –
Loss +
Debt +
NEnt – +
Mon + –
Sh4 + –
Stat + –
ShIn – – (or) +
InInv – – (or) +
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4.4. Dependent Variables
In our study, we use nominal rates of ad valorem tariffs and ad valorem
components of compound tariffs as the variables that reflect the level of
protection granted to Russian manufacturers against import competition.
Such a choice is determined by a number of features specific to the
Russian system of import regulation during the period of economic
transformation.
First of all, as noted in Section 2, during the period 1992–1997 import
tariffs played the central part in Russian import regulation policy. Alter-
native types of import barriers have not been used due to the absence
of a legal basis and the official obligations fixed in agreements with the
IMF. In principle, industry-specific subsidies could be regarded as a
supplement to (or even a substitute for) tariffs as a device to cushion
the negative influence of foreign competition on national producers;
however, no such subsidies existed in Russia during this time frame, ex-
cept for the agricultural sector. As we do not consider tariffs for agri-
cultural products, these subsidies are not relevant for our study. The
subsidization of individual enterprises is a widespread practice, espe-
cially on the regional level. But there is no reason to expect that the ex-
istence of regional firm-specific subsidies will undermine either the de-
sire of companies to acquire federal industry-specific tariffs or the
desire of the government to provide some "background" tariff support
for industries suffering from import competition, as this support is asso-
ciated with positive rather than negative (as in the case of subsidies)
cash flows for the treasury.
In general, as the 1992–1997 experience shows, ad valorem tariffs (or
ad valorem components of compound tariffs) were the primary means
used to limit import penetration, with specific components of compound
tariffs being applied as a supplementary device to counter tariff evasion
by importers. So an analysis of the political economy determinants of
protection should concentrate on ad valorem rates as the principal type
of import barriers.
Second, though the differences in nominal tariff rates might not corre-
spond to the differences in effective protection levels, a substantial de-
gree of realism should be assigned to the assumption that the structure
of nominal tariff rates accurately reflects the efforts of pressure groups
and government officials to limit import penetration in the national mar-
kets. On the one hand, members of pressure groups have relatively
complete information in their field of activity and thus can lobby for the
nominal tariff level that could guarantee them an optimal level of effec-
tive protection. On the other hand, decision makers in government, un-
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like producers, do not possess the information necessary to calculate
adequately optimal levels of effective protection. Thus, the realization of
their preferences on the protection of different production branches
should be directed at fixing nominal rates. Foreign economic subjects
and agencies are also more likely to concentrate attention on nominal
protection levels (e.g., IMF recommendations emphasize a reduction in
the weighted average of nominal tariff rates).
An important aspect of import regulation in Russia is that the compe-
tence to fix tariff levels is assigned to the executive branch of govern-
ment. This fact accounts for the continuity in tariff policy in 1992–1997;
it has contributed substantially to neutralizing the impact of political
changes during the period studied on the potential for different indus-
tries to receive protection against imports. In situations of intensive con-
flict between the federal legislative and executive branches (especially
sharp in 1992–1993) as well as in years of parliamentary (1993, 1995)
and Presidential (1996) elections, the efforts of the executive branch to
mobilize producer support provided all industry groups an opportunity to
realize fully their lobbying potential, rather than granted some industries
advantages over others.
The adequacy of using ad valorem tariff rates for estimating the level of
import barriers can be questioned on the ground that substantial
amounts of imports enter the country through shadow channels. The
practice of foreign trade regulation in Russia during the period studied
(and, in particular, during 1992–1994) has also been characterized by
granting tariff exemptions to numerous companies and agencies. Con-
sequently, a significant volume of imports was not subjected to tariff
control. However, it seems that this factor does not lower the impor-
tance of tariff rates for protectionist pressure groups and the govern-
ment. Though fixing high import tariffs can provide an additional stimu-
lus for shadow imports and thereby fail to generate a significant
decrease in import penetration, it nevertheless contributes to raising
prices and thus delivers benefits to national producers. It is also unlikely
that an exogenous rise in shadow imports can generate stimuli for
changing the level of tariff rates because these rates have to do only
with official imports. So, as reliable data on shadow imports are unavail-
able and we are forced to use data on official imports only, it is reason-
able to concentrate attention on tariff rates. First, they are designed
precisely for regulation of official import flows and so can react (through
the political economy links described in Sections 4.1–4.3) to changes in
their volume. Second, variation in tariff rates can be viewed, with a sub-
stantial degree of realism, as relatively independent of changes in
shadow imports.
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The same arguments can be applied to tariff-exempt imports, but here
we should discuss also the behavior of economic agents enjoying these
exemptions. The impact of factors associated with tariff exemptions can
be considered in a two-stage setting that determines the regulatory re-
gime for imports. In the first stage, tariff rates are chosen, and import-
ers can participate in this process by lobbying for lower tariff rates (or
against their increase), thus counteracting the efforts of protectionist
pressure groups. In the second stage (when tariff rates are already
fixed), importers could devote themselves to lobbying for tariff exemp-
tions, with tariff rates being unchanged. To the extent that these stages
are indeed separable, we can restrict our attention to the first stage
when studying the mechanisms of tariff determination, with lobbying by
importers being one of the potential factors that can undermine rela-
tions described in the pressure group hypothesis.
In reality, however, representatives of tariff-exempt organizations can be
interested in raising tariff rates for commodities imported by them in or-
der to increase the domestic prices and thus profits on their imports.
This factor is very difficult to account for because adequate information
is not available concerning the actual mechanisms by which importers’
interests are represented in the government, or concerning the charac-
ter of relations among importers themselves. So it seems reasonable to
consider any lobbying by tariff-exempt organizations to raise tariff levels
as exogenous to the system of relationships studied. To minimize possi-
ble distortions introduced in the results of our study due to this factor,
we have excluded from consideration those commodity types for which
tariff exemptions were most common (most notably, alcohol and to-
bacco). A possible test for the importance of this factor can be per-
formed by comparing those variables that exerted significant influence
on the level of tariff rates in 1992–1994, when tariff exemptions became
widespread, and in 1997, after their abolition according to Presidential
decrees 244 (6 March 1995) and No. 1363 (19 September 1996), as
well as the subsequent government resolutions. The abolition of these
exemptions was one of the conditions for providing Russia access to the
IMF credits.
As far as existing tariff exemptions are concerned (and first of all those
granted by the federal law "On the Agreements on Production Sharing"
that came into force on January 11, 1996), there is no evidence that or-
ganizations enjoying the exemptions are engaged in lobbying for raising
tariffs on the articles they import (primarily because the majority of
these articles are used for production purposes by the importers them-
selves). Moreover, the rationales for granting tariff exemptions are now
explicitly stated in legislation, so those importers who are entitled to
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receive an exemption have no reason to engage in lobbying for lowering
tariff rates. This allows us to concentrate attention on tariff levels, ig-
noring the role played by tariff exemptions under the contemporary im-
port regulation system.
5. ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND RESULTS
OF THEIR TESTING
5.1. Single Regression Models
For the purpose of the econometric analysis, a database was formed
that includes data on commodity types classified by the official statistics
(e.g., Russian Statistical Yearbook editions) as the "main commodities
of Russian foreign trade". We can expect that the degree of import
competition and the general situation on the national markets for these
commodities can attract the attention of government officials, even irre-
spective of pressure group activity. The lower the share of an industry in
the value of foreign trade flows, the lower is the probability that the gov-
ernment will pay attention to the impact of foreign trade factors on in-
dustry performance, unless producers themselves apply for government
support. Thus, the more detailed is the classification of commodity
types, the more likely that the bias in favor of the pressure group hy-
pothesis relative to the other hypotheses will appear in the data. By
concentrating our attention on the main trade items, we neutralize this
relative advantage of the pressure group hypothesis and provide a
sound basis for comparing the analytical potential of the different hy-
potheses.
Official statistics do not make it possible to calculate all commodity
market variables for all commodity types. What is more, unified data for
imports and exports from CIS and non-CIS countries are available only
since 1995. Due to these problems, three different data sets were
formed to test our hypotheses as well as two models: one model for
total foreign trade (1996–1997) and the other for trade with non-CIS
countries (1993–1997). Detailed information on the variables and com-
modity types included in these models (as well as on the specifics of the
Variants 1–3 of the models under consideration) can be found in the
Data Appendix, Section DA1.
As a first step to examine the impact of the political economy factors on
the level of tariff rates and consider the comparative performance of our
four hypotheses, we attempted to estimate for each year a single re-
gression model that includes all of the independent variables. This task
is rather complicated due to the significant degree of correlation within
the group of sectoral variables. In Appendix A, we present the results of
two tests based on the "orthodox" OLS regressions including the vari-
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ables that explain the major part of variance in the independent vari-
ables sets (Tables A1–A2), and the stepwise backward-selection linear
regressions (BSLR, Tables A3–A4).8 Variant 1 of these regressions is
characterized by the exceptionally high values of the R2 and 2aR  statistics,
with the F-ratio being always statistically significant at the 99 per cent
confidence level. For Variant 2, which does not include the commodity
market variables ShImp, ∆ShImp, and ShExp, the values of the R2 and 2aR
statistics are much lower, but the F-ratio remains statistically significant at
the 99 per cent confidence level in all cases except one.
For Variant 1, which includes all the commodity market variables, we
can formulate some more or less definite conclusions. As can be seen,
the results presented in Tables A1 and A3 are broadly consistent, with
Table A3 being nevertheless much more informative. In Table 3 below,
                                               
8 We were forced to drop some variables due to significant collinearity problems.
For details, see Data Appendix, Section DA2.
Table 3. Cases of Statistically Significant Impact of Independent Variables in
Single Regression Models (Variant 1).
Pressure group
hypothesis
Stagnant industry
support hypothesis
Liberalization
hypothesis
Foreign reper-
cussions
hypothesis
∆Imp Y: 1993, 1997a
N: 1996, 1996a
Y: 1993, 1997a
N: 1996, 1996a
Y: 1993, 1997a
N: 1996, 1996a
Y: 1993, 1997a
N: 1996, 1996a
∆Out Y:
N: 1993–1996,
1996a
Y:
N: 1993–1996,
1996a
ShImp Y: 1993,
1994–1997,
1996a–1997a
N:
Y: 1993, 1994–1997,
1996a–1997a
N:
Y:
N: 1993,
1994–1997,
1996a–1997a
∆ShImp Y: 1996a
N: 1993, 1997a
Y: 1996a
N: 1993, 1997a
Y: 1993, 1997a
N: 1996a
ShExp Y: 1993–1994,
1997a
N:
Y: 1993–1994,
1997a
N:
RExp Y:
N: 1994–1996,
1996a–1997a
Y:
N: 1994–1996,
1996a–1997a
ShImpI Y: 1993–1995,
1997
N:
Y:
N: 1993–1995,
1997
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Continued from p. 32
Pressure group
hypothesis
Stagnant industry
support hypothesis
Liberalization
hypothesis
Foreign reper-
cussions
hypothesis
Pri* Y: 1997
N: 1995–1996,
1996a
Emp Y: 1993–1996, 1997a
(1996a, 1997)
N:
Wage Y: 1994–1996, 1996a
N: 1993
Prof* Y: 1994, 1996,
1996a
N: 1993
Y: 1994, 1996,
1996a
N: 1993
Inv* Y: 1993
N: 1996
(1995, 1996a)
Loss* Y: 1993, 1997, 1997a
N: 1996, 1996a
Debt* Y: 1996
N: 1993, 1997a
NEnt Y:
N: (1993–1997,
1996a–1997a)
Y: (1993–1997,
1996a–1997a)
N:
Sh4* Y:
N: 1996 (1996a)
Y: 1996 (1996a)
N:
ShIn* Y:
N: 1995, 1996a
Y: 1995, 1996a
N:
Comment to Table 3.
In Table cells, years are indicated when the independent variables under consid-
eration exercised a statistically significant impact on tariff rates with the direction
of this impact corresponding (Y) or contrary (N) to the predicted one. Subscript
"a" denotes that the impact indicated refers to the models for total foreign trade;
otherwise, models for trade with non-CIS countries are implied. For the variables
marked with an asterisk, estimates only for selected years are available. This Ta-
ble is based on Table A3 (Appendix A), though for the variables Inv and Sh4 ad-
ditional information based on Table A1 is included in parentheses. For the vari-
able NEnt, additional information in parentheses refers to the single regression
models where this variable was substituted for the variable Emp.
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TARIFF PROTECTION34
we summarize information on the direction of statistically significant ef-
fects of the independent variables on tariff rates according to stepwise
backward-selection linear regressions. Among the commodity market
variables, the variable ShImp exercised a stable, statistically significant
impact consistent with the pressure group hypothesis and the stagnant
industry support hypothesis. At the same time, the direction of influence
of the variable ∆Out does not support these hypotheses. The impact of
the variable ShExp was in three cases consistent with the predictions of
the liberalization hypothesis and the foreign repercussions hypothesis,
but the impact of the variable RExp was contrary to what was predicted.
The variable ShImpI exercised a stable impact consistent with the fiscal
component of the liberalization hypothesis, but contrary to the foreign
repercussions hypothesis. The variables ∆Imp and ∆ShImp seem to ex-
ercise no stable influence on the level of tariff rates.
The situation with the sectoral variables Inv, Loss, Debt, Sh4, and ShInv
is similarly unsettled. Part of the problem can be associated with exces-
sive collinearity, which forced us to drop some variables for various
years. Nevertheless, the impact of the variable Prof seems to provide
support to the pressure group hypothesis and the stagnant industry
support hypothesis, and the impact of the variable Wage is consistent
with the stagnant industry support hypothesis for the period 1993–1996.
Special attention should be paid to the influence of the variables Emp
and NEnt. As noted in the Data Appendix, they are strongly correlated;
thus, when they enter our regressions simultaneously, their impacts of-
ten appear statistically insignificant. However, when either of these vari-
ables is excluded, the remaining variable exercises a positive impact on
the level of tariff rates that is in most cases statistically significant, as
can be seen in Tables A1 and A3. This result corresponds to the logic of
the stagnant industry support hypothesis. The positive effect on tariffs
by NEnt or Emp, however, contradicts the standard logic of the pressure
group hypothesis that considers industry concentration as a principal
factor of lobbying efficiency, with employment size being a factor of
secondary importance.
So much for Variant 1 of our models. As far as Variant 2 is concerned,
we were unable to trace any stable year-to-year impact of the inde-
pendent variables on the level of tariff rates. However, the exclusion of
different independent variables from the data set often leads to an in-
crease in the value of the 2aR  statistic (not shown in Tables A2 and A4).
This can be interpreted as evidence that the presence of irrelevant vari-
ables could hide actual relationships between the political economy
factors and the level of tariff rates.
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Several conclusions can be drawn from the results of testing single re-
gression models. First, there is a small group of variables (∆Out, ShImp,
ShExp, ShImpI, Emp, and NEnt) that are likely to exercise a stable im-
pact on the level of tariff rates during the entire period. However, the
observation of this impact does not allow us to make an unambiguous
statement in favor of any of the hypotheses under consideration. Sec-
ond, there seem to be considerable differences in the impact of some
variables in different years. Third, the large discrepancies between Vari-
ant 1 and Variant 2 should be explained. All of these facts lead us to the
task of estimating different regression models on a yearly basis for each
of our hypotheses in order to compare their explanatory power more
clearly.
5.2. Testing Regression Models for Individual Hypotheses
In this section we will discuss the results obtained by testing regression
models that include only those independent variables that are consid-
ered to be relevant to the particular hypotheses. It appears that these
models can provide deeper insight into the political economy mecha-
nisms of tariff formation than the models that include (rather mechani-
cally) all the independent variables used in the study. The central prob-
lem with the formulation of the "hypothesis-specific" models consists in
the exclusion of the collinearity effects that can lead to the indetermi-
nacy of regression results. Description of the respective regression
models and principles of their construction is presented in Section DA2
of the Data Appendix. The results of testing these models are summa-
rized in Appendix B.9
First of all, we should emphasize the substantial degree of variance in
the dependent variables that is explained by the independent variables
in 1993–1997 (as measured by the F-ratio) for the pressure group hy-
pothesis, the stagnant industry support hypothesis and the liberalization
hypothesis: significance levels are 99 per cent in all cases except for
Variant 1 of the pressure group hypothesis (1993). In Variant 1 (which
includes the maximum number of independent variables) of the pressure
group hypothesis, the value of the 2aR  statistic never falls below 0.677 in
1994–1997. For the liberalization hypothesis, the 2aR  statistic in models
for 1994–1997 always exceeds 0.733. As far as the stagnant industry
                                               
9 The results of our analysis can in principle be influenced by the effects of the
tariff unification process. For a discussion of this problem, see the Data Appen-
dix, Section DA3.
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support hypothesis is concerned, the value of the 2aR  statistic is some-
what lower than in the hypotheses mentioned above, though it never
falls below 0.65 during the period 1994–1997. Moreover, it is the only
hypothesis that provides a relatively good explanation for the tariff
structure in 1993 (the value of the 2aR  statistic exceeds 0.6 and is sig-
nificant at the 99 per cent confidence level).
In contrast, the performance of the foreign repercussions hypothesis
seems to be unimpressive. The values of the R2 and 2aR  statistics in the
basic variants of this hypothesis as well as in different subvariants (not
shown in Appendix B) are very low. The F-ratio is insignificant in Variant
1 of this hypothesis for all years. The exclusion of the variables ShImp,
∆ShImp, and ShExp in Variant 2 leads to an increase in the value of the
F-ratio and provides statistical significance to the coefficients — with the
predicted sign — on the variables RExp (1995–1997) and ShImpI (1996,
both models, and 1997, model for total foreign trade). The former effect
can be accounted for by the negative association between the variables
RExp and ShImp for these years (r < –0.65 in all cases). The variable
ShIn also exercises statistically significant impact on tariff rates in Vari-
ant 2 (1996, both models). However, the values of the R2 and 2aR  sta-
tistics in Variant 2 remain low. We can thus conclude that the foreign
repercussions hypothesis should be rejected as a possible explanation
for the tariff structure during the period 1993–1997.10
To estimate the comparative performance of the pressure group hy-
pothesis, the stagnant industry support hypothesis and the liberalization
hypothesis we need to analyze the direction of impact of the independ-
ent variables on tariff levels. It makes sense to begin with the liberaliza-
tion hypothesis. Though the sectoral variables NEnt and Sh4 have in
most cases the predicted sign and exercise a statistically significant im-
pact on the dependent variable, the behavior of the variables ∆Imp,
ShExp and RExp does not confirm the comparative advantage interpre-
tation presented in Section 4.3. The coefficient on the variable ShExp is
significant (at the 95 per cent confidence level) and has the predicted
sign only in models for 1994 and 1995. The coefficient on the variable
RExp, in turn, is either insignificant or, when significant, has a sign con-
trary to that predicted.
                                               
10 This finding is broadly consistent with the fact that questions of Russian import
tariff policy did not play any part in most trade disputes that led to trade sanc-
tions (or the threat thereof) against Russian exports during the period studied.
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The most notable feature of the liberalization hypothesis is the statisti-
cally significant positive impact of the variable ShImpI on the level of
tariff rates in models for 1993 and 1994 (Variants 1 and 2), 1995 (Vari-
ant 1), 1996 and 1997 (Variant 1, model for trade with non-CIS coun-
tries). This result corresponds to our expectations concerning the fiscal
role of import protection policy in the economy in transition.
Let us turn to the record of the alternative hypotheses. The pressure
group hypothesis and the stagnant industry support hypothesis rely on
the same set of commodity market variables. The values of the R2 and
2
aR  statistics for both hypotheses are also very close. This makes the
task of differentiating among these hypotheses quite complicated. How-
ever, the results of our analysis seem to testify to the comparatively
better performance of the stagnant industry support hypothesis. The
following arguments on this point can be put forward.
1) In the context of the stagnant industry support hypothesis, the vari-
able ShImp exercises a statistically significant impact on the level of
tariff rates in the models for 1993, 1995, and 1996–1997 (model for
trade with non-CIS countries) in the predicted direction. For the
pressure group hypothesis, this impact is traced for the same years,
but the significance level is always lower. In the pressure group hy-
pothesis, a positive coefficient on the ShImp variable is significant at
the 90 per cent confidence level in 1993 and 1996–1997 (as com-
pared with the 99 per cent confidence level in the former and the 95
per cent confidence level in the two latter cases for the stagnant in-
dustry support hypothesis in the models for the same years); for
1995, the confidence level is equal to the 95 per cent (as compared
with the 99 per cent for the stagnant industry support hypothesis).
2) The impact of the variable NEnt in the pressure group hypothesis is
always statistically significant but its direction is contrary to expecta-
tions. The same is true for the variable Sh4, 1994–1997: whenever it
exercises a statistically significant influence on the level of tariff
rates, the direction of this influence is negative, not positive. The co-
efficient on the variable Pri is always insignificant. Thus we can con-
clude that neither of the sectoral variables used to test the pressure
group hypothesis exercises the expected influence on the tariff lev-
els.11 The only exception is Variant 1 for 1993 where the coefficient
                                               
11 The variables NEnt and Sh4 are closely associated with the variables Mon and
Stat, respectively. A substitution of the latter variables for the former demon-
strates a strong negative (counterintuitive) impact of the variable Stat and a posi-
tive (intuitive) impact of the variable Mon on the level of tariff rates.
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on the variable Sh4 has the expected sign and is statistically signifi-
cant. But for this year the variable Sh4 is positively correlated with
the variable Debt (r=0.8), so that this impact can indirectly reflect a
relationship characteristic of the stagnant industry support hypothe-
sis.
3) To the contrary, the coefficients on the variables Emp and Loss in
the stagnant industry support hypothesis are always statistically sig-
nificant and have the predicted signs both in Variants 1 and 2 of our
models. Moreover, due to the fact that the variable Emp is positively
correlated with the variable NEnt, it is reasonable to suppose that the
relatively high values of the R2 and 2aR  statistics for the pressure
group hypothesis are accounted for not by some mysterious impact
of the variable NEnt but by the omitted variable effect, i.e., by the in-
direct impact of the variable Emp. The same is true for the variable
Sh4 which is negatively correlated with the variable Loss (in Variant
1, r < –0.59 in 1993–1994 and r < –0.65 in 1995–1997). These ef-
fects can also explain the high scores of the variables NEnt and Sh4
in the liberalization hypothesis.
The variable Debt also exercises a statistically significant impact on the
structure of tariff rates in 1993. (It is important to note that this variable
is calculated for the beginning of 1993 and thus can be regarded as a
determinant of the tariff structure established on March 15, 1993.)
Other things being equal, all this makes us consider the stagnant indus-
try support hypothesis in a more favorable light than the pressure group
hypothesis. However, there are some puzzling effects associated with
this hypothesis that deserve special attention. First, the coefficient on
the variable Debt in 1995 (Variant 1), 1996 (both models, Variant 2), and
1997 (the model for total foreign trade, both Variants, and the model for
trade with non-CIS countries, Variant 2) is statistically significant but has
the wrong sign.
The variable ∆Imp exercises the expected influence on the level of tariff
rates only in Variant 2 of the models for 1993 and 1994. It is also statis-
tically significant in Variant 1 of both models for 1996, but the coefficient
on it is not positive (as had been expected) but negative. This result
suggests that a higher level of protection in 1996 was associated not
with stronger but with weaker growth in imports.
Another important point is that the variable ∆Out seems to exercise no
regular expected impact on the level of tariff rates. A statistically signifi-
cant negative impact of this variable was found in both models for 1996
(Variant 2), and in the model for total foreign trade, 1997 (Variant 2).
This impact corresponds to our expectations, though the significance
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level is quite low (90 per cent in all cases). Mechanisms accounting for
the positive impact of the variable ∆Out on the level of tariff rates in
1993 and 1995 are much less clear.
To search for an explanation of these puzzles, we attempted to formu-
late "ideal" regression models that provide best approximation of the
relationships between the independent and dependent variables. These
models were constructed on the basis of the two hypotheses that ap-
peared to perform most successfully according to the R2 and 2aR  statis-
tics as well as the individual variable impact — i.e., the stagnant industry
support hypothesis and the liberalization hypothesis.
5.3. "Ideal" Regression Models
To construct the "ideal" regression models, the variables peculiar to the
liberalization hypothesis — ShExp, RExp, and ShImpI — were added to
the set of variables used to test the stagnant industry support hypothe-
sis. Then regressions were calculated on an iterative basis for each year
with the exclusion of statistically irrelevant variables. The procedure was
organized as follows. At the first stage, a regression equation was esti-
mated where one of the variables was omitted from the initial set of
variables, with the impact of this omission on the values of the 2aR  sta-
tistic and the F-ratio being estimated. Then this variable was introduced
back into the equation, and the next one omitted, and so on. After this
process was accomplished, variables that appear to be statistically in-
significant and whose exclusion leads to an increase in the values of the
2
aR  statistic and the F-ratio were dropped from the initial set of vari-
ables, and the new "basic" set of variables was formed. At the second
stage, the same operations were performed, and so on until the set of
variables was identified in which all variables exercise a statistically sig-
nificant impact on the level of tariff rates and the value of the 2aR  statis-
tic is maximized. The "ideal" regression models thus formed are pre-
sented in Appendix C.12
The analysis of the "ideal" regression models allows us to formulate the
following conclusions. First, there is a strong impact of the variables
Emp and Loss along the lines of the stagnant industry support hypothe-
sis. Second, the only commodity market variable that enters Variant 1 of
                                               
12 Unlike our previous models where we compare different hypotheses (and thus
skip testing Variant 3 of our models that does not include the variable ∆Out), here
we estimate the "ideal" models in three variants covering all commodity types in-
cluded in our database.
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the "ideal" regressions for all years is the variable ShImpI. Third, the
expected impact of the variable ShImp is traced only for 1995–1997 in
models for trade with non-CIS countries (and also for 1996, model for
total foreign trade). The exclusion of either of these two variables from
the "ideal" models leads to a very slight decrease in the value of the 2aR
statistic (no more than on 0.05) and a rise in the degree of statistical
significance of the coefficient on the remaining variable. It is important
to note that there is no association between the variables ShImp and
ShImpI in the sense of correlation or relationships in auxiliary regres-
sions, and thus both variables can be judged to be important for the ex-
planation of the protection structure in these years.13
The variable ShImpI is also the only variable relevant to the liberalization
hypothesis that enters our "ideal" regression models. Two interpreta-
tions of this fact are possible. First, the government can be interested in
alleviating import pressure on stagnant industries as well as in maximiz-
ing tariff revenues. Second, the government can try to limit the import
competition on the markets for the main commodity types produced by
stagnant industries, with the "side effect" of raising tariff revenues. The
latter interpretation is less likely due to the well-known priority given to
fiscal considerations in such aspects of tariff policy as fixing compound
tariff rates (see Section 2). In any case, results of the "ideal" regression
models can be considered to support the synthetic "stagnant indu-
stries — tariff revenues" hypothesis, according to which government
policy actually provides both support for stagnant industries and addi-
tional revenues to the budget.14
Now we should turn to the strange impact of the variables ∆Out and
∆Imp. For 1993–1995, a counterintuitive positive impact of the variable
∆Out is found. This result suggests that a higher level of tariff rates is
associated with a less intensive decrease in output. Perhaps this is a
sign that the government tried to support those industries that were able
to "fight for survival". This conclusion also can hold true for 1996 when
                                               
13 In Variant 1 of the "ideal" regression models for 1996, inclusion of the variable
Inv leads to a slight increase in the value of the 2aR  statistic as well as an in-
crease in the statistical significance of the variable ShImp (to the 95 per cent
level), whereas the statistical significance of the variable ShImpI falls to the level
of 90 per cent in the model for trade with non-CIS countries and even lower in
the model for total foreign trade.
14 It is worth noting that the influence of the variable ShImpI can be considered
as one of the factors explaining the stability of the tariff structure in 1995–1997
(see Data Appendix, Section DA4).
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a higher degree of protection was associated with a less intensive in-
crease in imports and a less intensive decrease in investments.15 It
seems that the impact of the variable ∆Imp suggests that the tariff
structure of 1995–1996 was oriented toward the protection of industries
which, though suffering from intensive import penetration (variable
ShImp), were able to counteract a further increase of imports more or
less successfully. A less optimistic interpretation is that the government
preferred to support industries facing a shrinking domestic market, for
which the level of import penetration (in physical terms) was high,
whereas the value of imports was falling.
Finally, some discussion on the impact of the variable Debt is appropri-
ate. Its coefficient turns out to be significant with the predicted (positive)
sign only in the model for 1993. In models for 1994–1997, the sign is
negative (though statistically significant only in 1997).16
The results presented above provide a sound basis for describing the
main forces governing the structure of tariff rates during the entire
1993-1997 period.17 For this purpose, we estimated OLS regression
models based on pooled data with dummies for each year.18 The results
are presented in Table D1 (Appendix D).19 As "variable-specific" dum-
                                               
15 Positive impact of the variable Inv can be traced in Tables B4–B5. It is possi-
ble, however, that this impact is caused by the negative association between the
variables Inv and Loss (r = –0.563). The impact of the variable ∆Imp in 1996 is
discussed in Data Appendix, Section DA5.
16 It is not likely that this difference is caused by our choice of the variables to
test models for 1993 (see Data Appendix, Section DA6).
17 One important question that remains to be discussed in the context of the
"ideal" regression models for particular years relates to their adequacy for the
explanation of changes in tariff rates. This question is explored in the Data Ap-
pendix, Section DA7.
18 Since the number of commodity types in our database is different for 1993–
1995 and 1996–1997, we estimated Variants 1–3 of the "ideal" model for pooled
data with identical data sets based on the 1993–1995 commodity bundles.
19 We experimented also with different "variable-specific" dummies that were
intended to reflect periods of stability in coefficients on the independent variables
in the "ideal" models for individual years. Though these dummies appeared to be
statistically significant in most cases, their inclusion never changes either the val-
ues of the R2 and 2aR  statistics or the coefficients on the independent variables
of the study (and even the values of their t-statistic) as compared with the panel
data models where these "variable-specific" dummies were absent. Thus, we can
conclude that the relationships discovered by using panel data technique are
quite stable during the entire period.
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mies do not appear important to the construction of models, we also
applied to our data the GLS random-effects regression technique used
to analyze panel data (Table D2).
Both tests indicate the existence of a relatively stable political economy
mechanism, the main features of which we have already discussed when
dealing with the results of "ideal" regression models for each particular
year. The impact of the variables ShImp, ShImpI, Emp, and Loss is con-
sistent with the "stagnant industries — tariff revenues" hypothesis.20 At
the same time, for the entire period 1993–1997 it is not possible to
trace any uniform relationship between the variables ∆Inv and ∆Out and
the level of tariff rates, and the impact of these variables on tariff struc-
ture can be more fruitfully analyzed in the context of "ideal" models for
each particular year.
Major novelties relate to the statistically significant impact of the vari-
ables Inv and Debt on the levels of tariff rates. While the impact of the
variable Inv in Variants 2 and 3 corresponds to the logic of the stagnant
industry support hypothesis, the impact of the variable Debt is contrary
to the reasoning underlying that hypothesis. We are unable to provide
any reasonable explanation for the latter effect. One possibility is that
the variable Debt reflects the influence of some political economy vari-
able(s) that does not enter our variable set.21 However, the exclusion of
this variable from our "ideal pooled models" leads to a negligible de-
crease in the value of the 2aR  statistic or the chi2 statistic. For example,
in Variant 1 of the model for trade with non-CIS countries, the exclusion
of the variable Debt decreases the 2aR  statistic from 0.682 to 0.676 (in
the OLS regression model with year dummies) and decreases the chi2
statistic from 272.24 to 264.40 (in the GLS random-effects regression
                                               
20 In the OLS regression models based on pooled data, we estimated the individ-
ual effect of the variable ShImpI in order to see whether the simple "tariff reve-
nue" hypothesis is an adequate tool to analyze the structure of tariff rates. In the
model for trade with non-CIS countries, the value of the 2aR  statistic equals
0.169 in Variant 1 and falls below 0.1 in Variants 2 and 3. In the model for total
foreign trade, the values of the 2aR  statistic are negative. We can conclude on
this ground that the tariff revenue motive is closely associated with the motive of
protecting stagnant industries. This fact supports our "synthetic" interpretation of
these motives.
21 There are no signs that the variable Debt is strongly correlated with any vari-
able used in this study or demonstrates a significant degree of association with
other variables in auxiliary regressions.
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model, with the respective values of the R2 statistic falling by less than
0.01). Thus we can conclude that the main part of variance in tariff rates
is explained (especially in Variant 1 of our models) by variables peculiar
to our synthetic "stagnant industries — tariff revenues" hypothesis.
It is worth noting that the values of the R2 and 2aR  statistics are always
highest in Variant 1 of all models, which include those commodity types
for which variables of import penetration could be calculated, irrespec-
tive of whether these variables exercise a statistically significant impact
on tariff rates in our models or not. The only reasonable explanation that
is not related to an unknown potential bias in our database has to do
with the informational aspect of the decision-making process. It is pos-
sible that the government pays principal attention to these commodity
groups precisely for the reason that the degree of import competition
can be estimated. Probably this is a consequence of our reliance on
"physical" measures of output and import penetration. Whereas the in-
dividual producers acting as the members of pressure groups can esti-
mate the variables ∆Out and ShImp in value terms (expressed in rubles
or US dollars), these estimates could be unavailable to the government
due to the enormous amount of calculations needed to produce them
(especially during a period of intensive exchange rate fluctuations, when
the calculation of these variables in a single currency would have re-
quired month-to-month adjustments).
6. CONCLUSIONS
The results of four tests performed in this study — i.e., the single re-
gression test, the test of individual hypotheses, and the "ideal" regres-
sion tests for each year as well as for panel data — appear to provide
support for the synthetic "stagnant industries — tariff revenues" hy-
pothesis. The emphasis on limiting import pressure for industries em-
ploying large number of workers and suffering from unfavorable busi-
ness conditions is quite common in government practice, as indicated
by the studies of political economy mechanisms of protection in indus-
trial countries. There are, however, considerable differences in the find-
ings of our analysis as compared with the results of similar studies for
other countries.
First of all, we should emphasize that the share of variance in protection
rates explained by our models is in most cases much larger than in
most studies of this sort performed by western scholars. For example, in
studies for 10 industrial countries surveyed in the work by Anderson and
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Baldwin (1987), the values of 2aR  statistic never exceed 0.51, whereas
in Variant 1 of our "ideal" models they are higher than 0.72 in all cases
except one (see Table C1).22 This finding can be interpreted as evi-
dence for a much more important role played by political economy
forces in determining tariff rates in Russia. In fact, this is what is be ex-
pected due to the absence in Russian case of a "historical level of pro-
tection" that exercises an influence on the structure of tariff rates in
stable market economies.
Second, we found no expected impact from the variables usually as-
sumed to reflect the logic of the pressure group hypothesis. This result
is likely to be accounted for by the transitional nature of the Russian
economy, with an abundance of firm-specific methods of rent-seeking
(lobbying for subsidies, tax write-offs, and so on) that do not require
inter-firm cooperation. In this sense, tariff regulation in Russia is unlikely
to serve as an important source of the policy-induced distortions typi-
cally associated with rent-seeking activity.
Third, the continual budgetary concerns of the revenue-constrained
Russian government are likely to explain the strong positive association
between the level of tariff rates and the share of individual commodities
in the total volume of import flows. Failure to ensure the successful col-
lection of other taxes has made tariff revenues one of the most reliable
sources of government financial resources, generating (at least partial)
subservience of the tariff policy to the fiscal preferences of the govern-
ment.
As our "ideal" regression models demonstrate, the mechanism govern-
ing the tariff structure was relatively stable during the entire period,
1993–1997. Thus we can conclude that the structure of the ad valorem
tariff rates formed in 1995–1997 reflects the conditions of the political
equilibrium established by the "stagnant industries — tariff revenues"
political economy mechanism. What can be said about the main features
of this equilibrium in respect to economic efficiency and the prospects
of liberalizing tariff regulation in Russia?
It seems that there are reasons to expect that the contradictions be-
tween political and economic efficiency usually cited by the researchers
of tariff policy (see, e.g., Magee et al., 1989, pp 50–52) are in the Rus-
sian case not as sharp as one could expect from general considera-
tions. As noted above, the formation of tariff policy seems to be rather
                                               
22 The values of the 2aR  statistic in the single regression models described in
Section 5.1 are even higher, being in the range of 0.849–0.925.
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free from pressure group activity and the economic disproportions as-
sociated with it.23 To use the classification put forward by James Bu-
chanan (see Buchanan, 1980), this is to say that the losses associated
with the first level of rent-seeking (affecting government decisions) as
well as the second level (competition among government officials for
positions with access to trade policy decisions and thus to appropriating
lobbying contributions) are minimized. Moreover, providing support to
stagnant industries does not cause additional disproportions associated
with the third level of rent-seeking (resource relocation to industries
benefiting from government policies), because rents created in these
industries by import tariffs are not high enough to attract new firms from
the outside economy.
These rents, however, alleviate the market pressures on the firms in
stagnant industries and delay the resource outflow to more productive
spheres of the economy. But the dynamics of business activity in Rus-
sian manufacturing testify convincingly that tariff protection is by no
means sufficient to eliminate these pressures completely. As a conse-
quence, the existing level of tariff protection, while preventing stagnant
industries from a complete collapse, can not be considered as an in-
surmountable obstacle to industrial restructuring.
In general, there are two reasons to expect that the "stagnant indus-
tries — tariff revenues" mechanism that currently accounts for the rela-
tively high tariff levels in particular industries will contribute to lowering
tariff rates as economic transition proceeds. On the one hand, the mi-
croeconomic adjustment and the exit of less-efficient firms from stag-
nant import-competing industries will decrease the number of loss-
making enterprises as well as the number of workers employed in these
industries. In this sense, the decline in the absolute size of stagnant in-
dustries would possibly lead not to an increase but to a decrease in the
level of protection, and thus broaden the scope of economically efficient
import operations.24 On the other hand, macroeconomic adjustment ac-
                                               
23 It is important to repeat that this conclusion is based on the analysis of data
for the main commodities of Russian foreign trade, with some variables used to
estimate lobbying potential of pressure groups being calculated at the sectoral
level. It is possible that introducing more detailed commodity classification and/or
substituting commodity market variables for the sectoral variables such as NEnt
and Sh4 would bring somewhat different results. However, the high explanatory
power of our models (in terms of basic regression statistics) allows us to suggest
that they can serve as an adequate ground for conclusions like those presented
in the text.
24 This effect is theoretically well-established; see e.g. Cassing and Hillman
(1986).
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companied by sound budget policies should lead to the alleviation of the
revenue shortfall, making tariff receipts less important for the govern-
ment.
Thus, the results of our analysis suggest that the political economy
mechanism of tariff regulation which emerged in the recent Russian in-
stitutional setting as a more or less natural response to the crisis envi-
ronment will possibly serve as an important factor contributing to the
dismantling of tariff barriers to imports under improved economic condi-
tions. Wide-scale liberalization, then, will likely be an endogenous prod-
uct of successful micro- and macroeconomic adjustment, rather than
emanating from the exogenous efforts of "benevolent" politicians or po-
litical advisers.
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DA1. Basic Information on the Construction of
the Econometric Models
The initial database formed for the purpose of econometric analysis in-
cluded more than 110 commodity types classified by the official statis-
tics as the "main commodities of Russian foreign trade". Some com-
modity types were excluded from the initial database because it was
impossible to calculate values of the independent variables for them,
and/or because these commodity types presented the most serious
doubts about the reliability of the import data (e.g., cigarettes, alcohol
and non-alcohol drinks). The resulting database comprises 100 com-
modity types. Data were taken from various issues of "The Russian Sta-
tistical Yearbook" as well as yearly publications "Russia in Figures",
"Customs Statistics of Russian Foreign Trade" and "Russian Industry".
Official statistics do not make it possible to calculate all commodity
market variables for all commodity types. One of the reasons is that the
State Customs Committee does not collect — or does not publish —
data on the physical volume of exports and imports for some goods (ex-
amples are steam boilers, combustion engines, excavators, pumps &
compressors, watches, carpets, furs & fur clothing, etc.). For broad
trade categories (such as ferrous products; equipment for metal works,
printing industry, and agriculture; medical equipment; organic and non-
organic chemicals; medications; plastics & plastic products, etc.) it is
impossible to establish any unified measure of physical volume of trade.
The diversity of goods consolidated under these commodity categories
precludes the mechanical summation of trade items even when they are
measured in the same units (like different types of cotton textiles), but
in many cases units of measurement are also different (e.g., trade flows
in some articles of the "sown timber" category are measured in tons,
and the others are measured in cubic meters).
Another problem caused by the incompatibility of physical volume
measures has to do with the calculation of such variables as shares of
imports (exports) in domestic output and consumption. In some cases,
units of physical volume used by customs statistics do not coincide with
those used by Goskomstat in output statistics. For example, data on im-
ports and exports of fertilizers (3 positions in our database) are pre-
sented in tons, whereas data on physical volume of output are ex-
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pressed in tons of "standard 100 per cent fertilizing equivalent". Like-
wise, data on imports of canned products (also 3 positions in our data-
base) are presented in tons, whereas data on physical volume of output
are expressed in millions of "standard cans".
Finally, the most specific problem has to do with the commodities pro-
duced by the non-ferrous metals industry. Absolute data on physical
volume of production in this industry are considered by Russian gov-
ernment as "strategically important" and do not appear in publications
(official data sources report only indices of year-by-year changes in the
physical volume of production of the respective commodity types).
Due to these data problems, three data sets were created. The first one
includes all variables listed in Table 2. In the second one, the variables
ShImp, ∆ShImp, and ShExp were excluded; in the third data set, we
have excluded also the variable ∆Out. These three data sets form the
basis for estimating three variants of the different models constructed in
Sections 5.1-5.3. It should be noted that the direct comparison of the
hypotheses under consideration (Sections 5.1-5.2) can be accom-
plished only with Variants 1 and 2 because they include the commodity
market variable ∆Out which is used to test the pressure group hypothe-
sis and the stagnant industry support hypothesis.
Official statistics began to present unified data for imports from and ex-
ports to CIS and non-CIS countries only since 1995. For 1992–1994,
data on trade flows from and to the CIS countries were presented for
commodity types different from those for the trade flows from and to
non-CIS countries. Units of physical volume of imports and exports were
in some cases also different. The reason was that the scheme used for
measuring the commodity flows between the republics of the former
USSR was for several years applied to the Russian trade with the newly
independent CIS countries.
As a consequence, for 1996–1997 we can calculate the values of inde-
pendent variables using data on the total foreign trade flows (i.e., trade
flows from and to CIS as well as non-CIS countries), whereas for 1992–
1994 these variables can be calculated only for trade flows from and to
non-CIS countries. For 1996 and 1997 we should test the political econ-
omy hypotheses with two sets of independent variables to estimate the
degree of similarity between the influence of factors related to total for-
eign trade and to trade with non-CIS countries. Thus, two models — one
for total foreign trade and another for trade with non-CIS countries —
have been constructed and estimated for these years. In the former
model, independent variables were calculated with the data on general
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exports and imports (e.g., ShImp is the share of total imports of a com-
modity in national consumption, RExp is the net total exports ratio, etc.),
whereas in the latter model data on exports and imports in the trade
only with non-CIS countries were used (with the variables being the
share of imports of a commodity from non-CIS countries in national
consumption, the net ratio of exports to non-CIS countries, etc.). For
1993–1995, only models for trade with non-CIS countries were tested.
As has been stated in Table 1, the tariff structure of 1993 is likely to be
influenced by the political economy developments of 1991–1992; thus,
we need to calculate commodity market variables for these years.
Meanwhile, the statistics for Russian foreign trade are available only
since 1992 (the first year after the breakdown of the USSR), so we can
not calculate for 1992 such variables as ∆Imp and ∆ShImp. Data on the
physical volume of output in Russian Federation exist for the entire pe-
riod of 1991–1997. Nevertheless, there are reasons to expect that the
output statistics of 1992 are less reliable because of the limited capa-
bilities of the Russian statistical service during the first year of its
autonomous existence. Thus, the values of the variables ∆Out and
ShImp calculated for 1992 seem to be also less reliable than those cal-
culated for 1993–1997 due to the (probable) incomplete comparability
of output data. On this basis, we used for the study of tariff structure in
1993 the independent variables calculated for 1993, not for 1992. Such
a procedure is further based on the assumption that the changes in for-
eign trade and output generated by the economic liberalization of 1992
were profound enough to affect the dynamics of the political economy
factors both in 1992 and 1993, so the observation of commodity market
variables for 1993 can serve as a reasonable approximation for the de-
velopments that took place in 1992.
In Table DA1, information is presented on the size of commodity bun-
dles used to estimate all variants of the different models. The number of
changes in tariff rates for the commodity types included in these bun-
dles is also indicated.
Two other important points on the construction of econometric models
should be emphasized. For 1993–1994, it was impossible to find data
for the calculation of the variables Pri and ShIn (direct foreign invest-
ments were quite small in these years, and the data on input prices
were not provided in open statistical sources). In addition, there is no
information on the share of enterprise debt in arrears in total liabilities to
suppliers. Thus, for the calculation of the variable Debt we used the
share of enterprises with overdue indebtedness to suppliers.
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Table DA1. Commodity Bundles Used to Test Political Economy Hypotheses.
Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3
1993
Foreign
trade with
non-CIS
countries
29 commodity
types,
14.491 per cent of
imports.
14 tariff changes.
56 commodity
types,
30.615 per cent of
imports.
31 tariff changes.
99 commodity
types,
52.81 per cent of
imports.
61 tariff changes.
1994
Foreign
trade with
non-CIS
countries
29 commodity
types,
14.491 per cent of
imports.
22 tariff changes.
56 commodity
types,
30.615 per cent of
imports.
45 tariff changes.
99 commodity
types,
52.81 per cent of
imports.
75 tariff changes.
1995
Foreign
trade with
non-CIS
countries
29 commodity
types,
13.223 per cent of
imports.
11 tariff changes.
56 commodity
types,
26.092 per cent of
imports.
17 tariff changes.
99 commodity
types,
50.59 per cent of
imports.
37 tariff changes.
1996
Total for-
eign trade
31 commodity
types,
16.984 per cent of
imports.
5 tariff changes.
57 commodity
types,
27.941 per cent of
imports.
8 tariff changes.
100 commodity
types,
49.86 per cent of
imports.
14 tariff changes.
1996
Foreign
trade with
non-CIS
countries
31 commodity
types,
13.827 per cent of
imports.
5 tariff changes.
57 commodity
types,
23.807 per cent of
imports.
8 tariff changes.
100 commodity
types,
46.36 per cent of
imports.
14 tariff changes.
1997
Total for-
eign trade
31 commodity
types,
17.521 per cent of
imports.
0 tariff changes.
57 commodity
types,
27.628 per cent of
imports.
0 tariff changes.
100 commodity
types,
51.123 per cent of
imports.
0 tariff changes.
1997
Foreign
trade with
non-CIS
countries
31 commodity
types,
14.072 per cent of
imports.
0 tariff changes.
57 commodity
types,
23.178 per cent of
imports.
0 tariff changes.
100 commodity
types,
47.388 per cent of
imports.
0 tariff changes.
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DA2. Solving Collinearity Problems
For identification of collinearity problems, correlation matrices for each
set of independent variables were calculated. In our regression models,
we were forced to drop the variables Mon and Stat due to their very
close association with the variables NEnt and Sh4, respectively (the
correlation coefficients being higher than 0.8 for most years). There is
also a substantial degree of correlation between the variables NEnt and
Emp (the correlation coefficient is in most cases higher than 0.9). For
these reasons, we have not considered variables Emp, Mon, and Stat
when testing the pressure group hypothesis and the liberalization hy-
pothesis; it was assumed that their impact can be captured by the vari-
ables NEnt and Sh4, which have the further advantage of being inten-
sively used in empirical studies of this type. As far as the variable InInv
is concerned, official statistics present data for only a limited number of
industrial sectors. At the same time, data on the variable ShIn are at
hand for all industrial sectors and often correlate significantly with the
available estimates of the variable InInv. For these reasons, we dropped
the variable InInv from our analysis.
As a further step to identify potential collinearity problems in the regres-
sion models for different hypotheses (see Section 5.2), auxiliary regres-
sions were calculated for each of the independent variables in the vari-
able sets intended to be used in tests of individual hypothesis
performance. As a result, strong links with other independent variables
were discovered for the following sectoral variables: Prof (the pressure
group hypothesis); and, Wage and Prof (the stagnant industry support
hypothesis). Since the inclusion of these variables in the regression
models could lead to the indeterminacy of regression results, they were
not used in our analysis. Additional reasons for the exclusion of these
variables are that the variable Prof refers only to officially recorded prof-
its, whereas the variable Wage is related to the wages due, not wages
paid. As a consequence, they could fail to provide information neces-
sary to estimate the real scope of financial problems experienced by
enterprises belonging to specific industrial sectors. The variable Inv ap-
peared to have a significant 2aR  statistic (with the values larger than 0.7)
in auxiliary regressions for 1992–1995 (being negatively correlated with
the variables Debt and Loss), and was not considered in our models for
these years.
The most important problem is associated with the relationship between
the commodity market variables. The variables ShImp and ∆ShImp ap-
pear to be significantly correlated with one another in models for
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1993–1994 and 1996–1997 (with r=0.739 in the models for 1993–1994,
r=0.748 in the model for total foreign trade, 1996, r=0.658 in the model
for trade with non-CIS countries, 1996, and r=0.861 in the model for
total foreign trade, 1997), and they demonstrate a significant degree of
association in auxiliary regressions. The value of the 2aR  statistic in aux-
iliary regressions for these variables is in most cases higher than 0.6,
when both variables are included in the models. At the same time, ex-
clusion of either of these two variables from the models leads to a sharp
decrease in the value of the 2aR  statistic in auxiliary regressions for the
remaining variable. Since both variables ShImp and ∆ShImp are of cru-
cial importance for our study, we have estimated 3 special forms of
Variant 1 for the pressure group hypothesis, the stagnant industry sup-
port hypothesis and the foreign repercussions hypothesis: Subvariant
1.1 with the inclusion of both variables, Subvariant 1.2 with the exclusion
of the variable ShImp and Subvariant 1.3 with the exclusion of the vari-
able ∆ShImp.
However, testing the Subvariants 1.2 and 1.3 did not produce any addi-
tional information as compared with testing Subvariant 1.1, and for rea-
sons of presentation we have not included Subvariants 1.2 and 1.3 in
Tables B1–B7, where the results of the regression analysis are demon-
strated. Two exceptions are the pressure groups hypothesis and the
stagnant industry support hypothesis in the model for total foreign trade,
1997. In this model, the variable ∆ShImp is also closely correlated with
the variable ∆Out (r=0.870), so we have presented the results of testing
Subvariant 1.3, which does not include the variable ∆ShImp.
In both models for 1996, the variables ShImp and ∆ShImp appear to be
negatively correlated with the variable ∆Out (r < –0.7). However, specific
subvariants of these models do not add any new information to that
learned from the basic Subvariant 1.1.
DA3. Estimating the Significance of the Tariff Unification
To estimate the potential significance of the tariff unification process, for
each year the degree of relationship was estimated between the level of
tariff rates in the previous year and the absolute tariff changes during
the year under consideration. As Table DA2 shows, tariffs on commodity
types included in our database do demonstrate some signs of unifica-
tion, in the sense that high tariff rates were less likely to be raised and
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more likely to be decreased (the opposite being true for low tariff rates).
However, the results of regressing tariff changes on tariff levels make
clear that, though the relationship between the tariff level in the previous
year and the absolute tariff changes in the year under consideration is
quite strong (F-ratio being significant at the 95 per cent level in 5 out of
12 cases and significant at the 99 per cent level in 3 other cases), it ac-
counts only for a small portion of changes in tariff levels (for Variant 3,
1995, where the association between tariff rates and tariff changes is
the closest, R2 = 0.232 and 2aR  = 0.224).
This is probably caused by the fact that most of the commodity types
with "peak" tariff rates (e.g., alcohol, precious stones and metals, ex-
plosives, arms and military technique, equipment for gambling business,
etc.) do not enter our database. Moreover, it could be noted that a
negative correlation between the tariff changes and the tariff levels is
present also in 1993, when there was in effect a shift from the almost
uniform tariff structure of 1992 toward a more differentiated one. Thus
we can conclude that the factor of tariff unification is unlikely to influ-
ence our analysis significantly.
DA4. Explaining the Stability of Tariff Rates.
The assumption on the role of governmental fiscal considerations cap-
tured by the variable ShImpI is reinforced by the stability of the tariff
structure during 1995–1997. As has been stated in Table DA1, there
were only few changes in ad valorem tariff rates and ad valorem com-
Table DA2. Coefficients of correlation: tariff rates in a previous year to tariff
changes in a given year.
Year Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3
1993 –0.269 –0.310 –0.320
1994 –0.071 –0.325 –0.185
1995 –0.299 –0.395 –0.480
1996 –0.396 –0.29 –0.220
Note: In 1997, there were no changes in ad valorem tariff rates and ad valorem
components of compound tariff rates (for commodity types included in our data-
base).
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ponents of compound tariff rates in 1996, and no such changes in 1997.
In Table DA3, correlation coefficients are presented that characterize
the degree of association between the shares of specific trade goods in
the total value of imports for different years (for 100 commodity types).
It can be seen that there is a strong association between the values of
the variable ShImpI in 1994 and 1996 (especially for the trade with non-
CIS countries) as well as in 1996 and 1997. According to our synthetic
"stagnant industries — tariff revenues" hypothesis, this stability of the
values of the variable ShImpI can be seen as a factor of stability of the
tariff structure in 1995–1997.
DA5. Explaining the Impact of the Variable ∆I m p in 1996
It can be supposed that the counterintuitive impact of the variable ∆Imp
on the structure of tariff rates in 1996 is caused by the fact that this
variable itself depends on the level of tariff rates established in 1995,
and its positive relationship with the tariff levels in 1996 is due to the
fact that there were few tariff changes during this year. Thus, the prob-
lem of endogenity mentioned in Section 1 could be suspected to affect
our results.
However, the correlation coefficients between the tariff levels in 1995
and the values of the ∆Imp variable in 1996 are very low (see
Table DA4). In other words, the impact of the variable ∆Imp probably
reflects more important phenomena than a mere statistical relationship.
Table DA3. Correlation coefficients for the ShImpI variable.
1993a 1994a 1996b 1996a 1997b 1997a
1993a 1
1994a 0.593 1
1996b 0.384 0.634 1
1996a 0.379 0.781 0.871 1
1997b 0.396 0.647 0.937 0.910 1
1997a 0.356 0.691 0.787 0.946 0.919 1
Note: index a denotes that the data are related to foreign trade with non-CIS
countries; index b denotes that the data are related to total foreign trade.
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Table DA4. Correlation between the tariff rates in 1995 and the variable ∆Imp
in 1996.
Model for total foreign trade
Variant 1
Variant 2
Variant 3
–0.227
–0.187
–0.127
Model for trade with non-CIS countries
Variant 1
Variant 2
Variant 3
  0.159
  0.045
–0.093
DA6. Analyzing the specificity of the model for 1993
As noted in Section DA1, the variable Debt was calculated for 1993–
1994 on a different basis than for 1995–1996. We also tested the
"ideal" regressions for the latter years with the inclusion of the variable
Debt* denoting, like the variable Debt for 1993–1994, the share of
enterprises with overdue indebtedness to suppliers. The impact of this
variable does not differ significantly from that of the variable Debt.
As the set of independent variables in the "ideal" regression for 1993
does not include variables measuring change in the import flows from
year to year, we recalculated this set for 1992 (basic set of independent
variables used to analyze the tariff stricture of 1993 refers to 1993, not
1992; see Section DA1). In the "ideal" regression for 1993 based on
1992 data, coefficients on the variables ∆Out and ShImpI are not signifi-
cant, and the values of the R2 and 2aR  statistics are 0.487 and 0.384 re-
spectively, lower than in the "ideal" regression model based on 1993
data. This supports our initial assumption that the data for 1993 provide
a better approximation of the developments in the turbulent year of
1992, for which statistics are less reliable.
DA7. Explaining the Changes in Tariff Rates
To explore the applicability of our hypotheses to the explanation of the
changes in tariff rates, absolute changes in tariff rates were used as the
dependent variable in the "ideal" regression models (constructed in
Section 5.3 for the tariff levels) as well as in our conventional hypothe-
ses. For 1995 and 1996, the values of the 2aR  statistic in these regres-
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sions are for the most part negative (and when positive, they never ex-
ceed 0.1). In the model for 1994, the 2aR  statistic in the "ideal" regres-
sion is also small (0.1025). However, in the models for the pressure
group hypothesis and the stagnant industry support hypothesis for
1994, the values of the R2 and 2aR  statistics are high (up to 0.6 in the
former case and up to 0.5 in the latter case in different variants), but
the coefficients on the independent variables are for the most part not
statistically significant, and the direction of impact of these variables is
not regular. Relatively high values of the R2 and 2aR  statistics seem to
be caused by the fact that absolute tariff changes in 1994 were signifi-
cantly correlated with the level of tariff rates in the same year (see
Table DA5), and thus the impact of the independent variables on the
tariff level is partially reflected in tariff changes. In other words, the rela-
tionship between the independent variables and tariff changes is purely
statistical, not causal.
For 1993, the values of the R2 and 2aR  statistics are even higher (in
Variant 1 of the pressure group hypothesis and the stagnant industry
support hypothesis), but statistically significant effects were found only
for the variables ∆Out (in both hypotheses, with the direction of impact
corresponding to that presented in Table C1), Loss (the stagnant indus-
try support hypothesis) and Sh4 (the pressure group hypothesis). The
variable Debt in Variants 1 and 2 of the stagnant industry support hy-
pothesis (as well as in all variants of the "ideal" regression model)
turned out also to be statistically significant, but has the wrong sign. It
can be concluded that, though the independent variables do exercise
some impact on the changes in tariff levels during 1993–1994, this im-
pact is probably no more than a statistical reflection of the adaptation of
tariff structures to the system of political economy factors described in
Sections 5.1–5.3 of the text.
Table DA5. Correlation between the level of tariff rates and the changes in tariff
rates during the year.
Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3
1993   0.452   0.710   0.730
1994   0.655   0.475   0.627
1995 –0.0096 –0.068 –0.115
1996 –0.144 –0.01   0.107
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APPENDICES
A. Results of Testing Single Regression Models
Table A1. Single regression models (OLS technique), Variant 1.
Model for trade with non-CIS countries Model for total
foreign trade
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1996 1997
 Y  8.29
 0.27
 35.84
 0.998
 20.46
 0.618
 127.88
 1.068
 –50.41
 –0.965
  182.44
  1.506*
  –38.75
  –0.676
 ∆Imp  0.01
 0.774
 0.0071
 0.456
 0.0027
 0.629
 –0.019
 –1.112
 –0.0013
 –0.054
  –0.021
  –1.453*
  0.039
  1.405*
 ∆Out  0.19
 3.129****
 0.092
 1.311
 0.15
 1.766*
 0.011
 0.152
 0.073
 0.529
  0.14
  1.350*
  0.068
  0.620
 ShImp  0.35
 3.578****
 0.11
 0.974
 0.13
 2.191**
 0.16
 2.022**
 0.077
 1.374*
  0.14
  1.830**
  0.099
  2.067**
 ∆ShImp  –0.47
 –3.85****
 –0.136
 –0.966
 –0.018
 –0.310
 –0.18
 –0.902
 –0.035
 –0.172
  0.24
  1.349*
  –0.11
  –1.935**
 ShExp  –0.162
 –1.939**
 –0.16
 –1.612*
 –0.06
 –0.776
 –0.037
 –1.052
 0.000036
 0.497
  –0.0029
  –0.830
  –0.13
  –1.630*
 RExp  0.03
 1.521*
 0.064
 2.507**
 0.06
 2.012**
 0.031
 1.328
 0.012
 0.536
  0.048
  1.423*
  0.038
  1.497*
 ShImpI  2.18
 1.772**
 6.44
 4.465****
 4.07
 1.809**
 1.44
 0.793
 2.59
 1.617*
  0.28
  0.164
  1.42
  0.797
 Pri no data no data  –0.11
 –1.928**
 –1.18
 –1.004
 0.37
 0.778
  –1.83
  –1.476*
  0.27
  0.638
 Emp dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped
 Wage  0.034
 0.490
 –0.21
 –2.591**
 –0.22
 –2.179**
 –0.13
 –1.639*
dropped   –0.23
  –2.432**
dropped
 Prof  –0.03
 –0.010
 –0.58
 –1.685*
dropped  –0.13
 –0.17
dropped   –0.69
  –0.917
dropped
 Inv  –4.54
 –2.166**
 –0.80
 –0.327
 4.71
 1.395*
 31.07
 2.145**
 2.81
 0.553
  47.07
  2.764***
  0.23
  0.019
 Loss  0.72
 1.435*
 –0.059
 –0.079
 –0.34
 –0.785
dropped  0.26
 1.801**
dropped   0.281
  1.072
 Debt  –0.427
 –1.230
 –0.032
 –0.062
 0.35
 1.086
 –0.52
 –0.310
dropped   –1.356
  –0.804
  –0.053
  –0.077
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Model for trade with non-CIS countries Model for total
foreign trade
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1996 1997
 NEnt  0.0003
 2.664***
 0.0006
 4.535****
 0.0008
 5.664****
 0.0005
 1.90**
 0.00025
 2.095**
  0.0007
  2.262**
  0.00023
  2.413**
 Mon dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped
 Sh4  0.297
 0.815
 0.308
 0.725
 0.013
 0.078
 –1.02
 –1.10
 –0.16
 –0.503
  –1.68
  –1.710*
  –0.049
  –0.080
 Stat dropped dropped dropped  0.83
 0.521
dropped   1.77
  1.094
dropped
 ShIn no data no data  3.05
 1.734*
 –3.23
 –1.231
 –0.39
 –0.269
  –4.94
  –1.758*
  0.37
  0.233
   R2
  2aR
   F
 0.893
 0.786
 8.37***
 0.917
 0.833
 10.99***
 0.925
 0.838
 10.63***
 0.919
 0.827
 9.94***
 0.849
 0.734
 7.38***
  0.907
  0.801
  8.53***
  0.861
  0.740
  7.10***
Notes.
Upper figure in a cell refers to the value of a regression coefficient,
lower figure refers to the value of t-statistic.
Y — Y-intercept
* — significant at the 90 per cent level;
** — significant at the 95 per cent level;
*** — significant at the 99 per cent level;
**** — significant at the 99.5 per cent level.
For the F-ratio, only 95 per cent and 99 per cent confidence levels are consid-
ered.
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Table A2. Single regression models (OLS technique), Variant 2.
Model for trade with non-CIS countries Model for total
foreign trade
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1996 1997
Y –10.25
–0.324
20.98
0.391
30.40
0.926
192.34
1.125
0.90
0.010
115.45
0.886
–17.13
–0.162
∆Imp 0.04
3.702****
0.030
2.655***
0.0053
0.850
–0.007
–0.357
0.0064
0.379
–0.007
–0.498
0.0083
0.331
∆Out 0.11
1.80**
0.026
0.389
0.0058
0.068
–0.067
–1.148
–0.044
–0.934
–0.077
–1.355*
–0.055
–1.149
RExp –0.013
–0.706
0.026
1.307*
0.019
0.679
–0.0024
–0.108
–0.015
–0.753
0.016
0.613
0.0082
0.353
ShImpI 1.14
0.795
3.46
2.253**
2.45
0.887
–0.19
–0.092
0.53
0.306
1.94
0.873
2.10
1.046
Pri no data no data –0.049
–0.569
–0.88
–1.061
0.034
0.040
–0.65
–0.764
0.30
0.309
Emp dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped
Wage 0.156
1.663*
–0.067
–0.689
–0.063
–0.521
–0.0036
–0.040
0.066
0.341
–0.012
–0.131
–0.017
–0.077
Prof 0.195
0.443
–0.074
–0.159
dropped –1.88
–0.907
dropped –0.52
–0.319
dropped
Inv –3.64
–1.036
–0.557
–0.148
0.14
0.034
dropped –2.35
–0.461
dropped dropped
Loss 0.65
0.753
0.36
0.390
–0.095
–0.227
–1.47
–0.916
0.26
1.324*
–0.38
–0.283
0.14
0.505
Debt 0.076
0.149
–0.079
–0.145
–0.019
–0.004
–0.099
–0.246
dropped –0.63
–0.504
0.044
0.134
NEnt –9.74e–7
–0.066
0.00025
1.613*
0.0003
1.527*
0.00013
0.341
0.00014
0.837
0.0003
1.054
0.00009
0.465
Mon dropped dropped dropped 0.087
0.669
dropped dropped dropped
Sh4 –0.54
–1.166
–0.103
–0.208
–0.134
–0.664
–0.76
–1.332*
–0.27
–0.464
–0.66
–1.045
–0.307
–0.564
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Model for trade with non-CIS countries Model for total
foreign trade
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1996 1997
Stat dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped 0.514
0.487
dropped
ShIn no data no data 1.41
0.749
3.60
0.988
–0.20
–0.082
1.54
0.648
–0.14
–0.050
  R2
 2aR
  F
0.518
0.397
4.30***
0.522
0.402
4.36***
0.413
0.249
2.52**
0.449
0.282
2.69***
0.4361
0.298
3.16***
0.459
0.296
2.81***
0.442
0.306
3.24***
Notes.
Upper figure in a cell refers to the value of a regression coefficient,
lower figure refers to the value of t-statistic.
Y — Y-intercept
* — significant at the 90 per cent level;
** — significant at the 95 per cent level;
*** — significant at the 99 per cent level;
**** — significant at the 99.5 per cent level.
For the F-ratio, only 95 per cent and 99 per cent confidence levels are consid-
ered.
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Table A3. Stepwise backward-selection linear regressions, Variant 1.
Model for trade with non-CIS countries Model for total
foreign trade
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1996 1997
Y 102.76
2.278**
36.41
5.135****
78.44
1.839**
232.94
2.97***
–96.40
–2.013**
402.93
1.75**
–53.06
–1.344*
∆Imp 0.019
1.707*
0.011
0.803
0.0027
0.629
–0.0216
–1.567*
0.00093
0.04
–0.021
–1.453*
0.044
1.670*
∆Out 0.203
4.165****
0.1004
1.70*
0.151
1.766*
0.119
1.362*
0.0738
0.562
0.142
1.35*
0.060
0.582
ShImp 0.346
4.332****
0.094
0.944
0.129
2.191**
0.128
1.855**
0.0703
1.34*
0.140
1.83**
0.113
2.579***
∆ShImp –0.456
–4.57****
–0.115
–0.923
–0.0176
–0.310
0.212
1.319
0.025
0.164
0.235
1.349*
–0.122
–2.26**
ShExp –0.242
–3.45****
–0.195
–2.344**
–0.059
–0.776
–0.0028
–0.832
0.00004
0.598
–0.0029
–0.83
–0.11
–1.61*
RExp 0.011
0.550
0.064
3.127****
0.061
2.01**
0.053
1.752*
0.00077
0.037
0.048
1.42*
0.0355
1.468*
ShImpI 2.611
2.535**
6.713
5.77****
4.07
1.81**
0.46
0.281
3.30
2.13**
0.285
0.164
1.44
0.865
Pri no data no data –0.193
–2.12**
–1.35
–2.933***
0.766
1.617*
–1.83
–1.476*
0.414
1.014
Emp 0.020
2.697***
0.002
5.49****
0.0082
1.395*
0.0089
3.813****
0.0018
1.302
0.011
0.76
0.0025
2.018**
Wage 0.199
3.374****
–0.168
–6.36****
–0.217
–2.18**
–0.243
–2.673***
–0.03
–0.378
–0.234
–2.43**
0.007
0.085
Prof 0.432
1.793**
–0.541
–5.18****
dropped –2.536
–2.328**
dropped –5.511
–1.83*
dropped
Inv –15.98
–3.33****
dropped dropped 30.56
3.609****
dropped dropped dropped
Loss 2.59
3.62****
dropped –0.242
–0.526
–1.996
–2.557**
0.380
2.125**
4.498
–1.93**
0.475
2.268***
Debt –2.08
–2.90***
dropped –0.134
–0.608
0.449
1.805**
dropped 0.18
0.808
–0.243
–2.16**
NEnt –0.0056
–2.56**
dropped –0.0005
–0.596
dropped dropped 0.00023
0.264
dropped
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Model for trade with non-CIS countries Model for total
foreign trade
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1996 1997
Sh4 dropped dropped 0.064
0.361
–1.11
–3.09****
dropped –1.075
–1.33
dropped
ShIn no data no data 5.36
2.252**
dropped dropped 9.628
1.83*
dropped
  R2
 2aR
  F
0.927
0.853
12.60***
0.911
0.861
18.37***
0.9236
0.838
10.63***
0.906
0.812
9.61***
0.829
0.73
8.36***
0.907
0.801
8.53***
0.854
0.757
8.79***
Notes.
Upper figure in a cell refers to the value of a regression coefficient,
lower figure refers to the value of t-statistic.
Y — Y-intercept
* — significant at the 90 per cent level;
** — significant at the 95 per cent level;
*** — significant at the 99 per cent level;
**** — significant at the 99.5 per cent level.
For the F-ratio, only 95 per cent and 99 per cent confidence levels are consid-
ered.
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Table A4. Stepwise backward-selection linear regressions, Variant 2.
Model for trade with non-CIS countries Model for total
foreign trade
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1996 1997
Y 126.42
2.604**
37.72
4.251****
19.94
1.074
–31.48
–1.135
–22.90
–0.483
–32.7
–1.235
–39.06
–0.522
∆Imp 0.0435
4.448****
0.033
3.093****
0.0042
0.936
–0.0088
–0.478
0.011
0.689
–0.011
–0.820
0.0091
0.366
∆Out 0.113
1.924**
0.011
0.175
–0.0017
–0.021
–0.056
–0.981
–0.0455
–0.977
–0.069
–1.249
–0.0531
–1.121
RExp –0.027
–1.412*
0.033
1.987**
–0.0047
–0.218
–0.0159
–0.852
–0.011
–0.652
–0.0044
–0.209
0.0085
0.371
ShImpI 1.478
1.058
3.92
2.635***
1.364
0.520
0.398
0.211
1.036
0.610
1.747
0.883
2.10
1.053
Pri no data no data –0.0446
–0.853
0.158
1.140
0.503
1.087
0.192
1.409*
0.883
0.860
Emp 0.0175
2.193**
0.00095
2.163**
0.0013
2.137**
–0.00021
–0.187
–0.00041
–0.448
–0.00033
–0.286
0.0017
1.061
Wage 0.159
2.276**
–0.153
–4.29****
–0.018
–0.42
0.0068
0.113
–0.129
–3.12****
–0.016
–0.258
0.0092
0.059
Prof 0.205
0.619
–0.390
–2.644***
dropped 0.738
1.048
dropped 0.755
1.115
–1.35
–0.740
Inv –16.13
–3.08****
dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped –6.91
–0.801
Loss 1.66
1.687**
dropped 0.446
2.115**
0.649
2.045**
dropped 0.653
2.168**
–0.0073
–0.011
Debt –1.99
–2.46***
dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped –0.581
–1.788**
NEnt –0.0053
–2.211**
dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped
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Model for trade with non-CIS countries Model for total
foreign trade
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1996 1997
Mon dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped
Sh4 dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped
Stat dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped
ShIn no data no data dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped
  R2
 2aR
  F
0.552
0.440
4.93***
0.485
0.410
6.46***
0.365
0.257
3.38***
0.414
0.301
3.68***
0.381
0.293
4.31***
0.426
0.316
3.87***
0.446
0.310
3.29***
Notes.
Upper figure in a cell refers to the value of a regression coefficient,
lower figure refers to the value of t-statistic.
Y — Y-intercept
* — significant at the 90 per cent level;
** — significant at the 95 per cent level;
*** — significant at the 99 per cent level;
**** — significant at the 99.5 per cent level.
For the F-ratio, only 95 per cent and 99 per cent confidence levels are consid-
ered.
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B. Results of Testing Regression Models
for Individual Hypotheses
Table B1. Model for foreign trade with non-CIS countries, 1993.
Variant 1 Variant 2
PGH SISH LH FRH PGH SISH LH FRH
Y-inter-
cept
–7.33
–0.888
–36.8
–3.85****
–1.01
–0.292
4.45
2.04**
2.23
0.39
–19.3
–2.52***
4.69
1.73**
7.64
5.49****
∆Imp –0.015
–0.831
N
0.0008
0.056
Y
–0.02
–1.18
N
0.022
0.09
Y
0.038
3.45****
Y
0.044
4.37****
Y
0.038
3.406****
Y
0.039
3.32****
Y
∆Out 0.051
0.566
N
0.174
2.356**
N
0.041
0.615
N
0.068
1.14
N
ShImp 0.14
1.481*
Y
0.19
2.65***
Y
0.17
1.04
N
∆ShImp –0.18
–1.348
N
–0.23
–2.31**
N
–0.17
–0.54
Y
ShExp –0.0056
–0.063
Y
–0.06
–0.42
Y
RExp 0.017
0.863
N
0.024
0.85
N
0.029
1.69*
N
0.005
0.34
N
ShImpI 3.77
2.15***
A
4.13
1.9**
N
2.18
1.39*
A
1.48
0.9
N
Emp 0.001
3.3****
Y
0.00044
1.39*
Y
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Variant 1 Variant 2
PGH SISH LH FRH PGH SISH LH FRH
Loss 1.65
4.93****
Y
1.32
4.08****
Y
Debt 0.29
3.87****
Y
0.23
2.89****
Y
NEnt 0.00053
3.835****
N
0.00047
2.99****
Y
0.00024
2.116**
N
0.00028
2.717****
Y
Sh4 0.19
1.645*
Y
0.512
0.64
N
–0.022
–0.23
N
–0.06
–0.51
Y
  R2
 2aR
  F
0.485
0.344
3.45**
0.71
0.61
7.32***
0.533
0.406
4.19***
0.24
0.04
1.19
0.262
0.204
4.52***
0.43
0.37
7.49***
0.303
0.23
4.35***
0.19
0.14
4.02**
Notes.
Upper figure in a cell refers to the value of a regression coefficient,
lower figure refers to the value of t-statistic.
* — significant at the 90 per cent level;
** — significant at the 95 per cent level;
*** — significant at the 99 per cent level;
**** — significant at the 99.5 per cent level.
For the F-ratio, only 95 per cent and 99 per cent confidence levels are consid-
ered.
Y — the direction of impact of a variable corresponds to the expected one;
N — the direction of impact of a variable does not correspond to the expected
one;
A — predicted sign is ambiguous.
Abbreviations:
PGH— pressure group hypothesis;
SISH — stagnant industry support hypothesis;
LH — liberalization hypothesis;
FRH — foreign repercussions hypothesis.
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Table B2. Model for foreign trade with non-CIS countries, 1994.
Variant 1 Variant 2
PGH SISH LH FRH PGH SISH LH FRH
Y-intercept –0.447
–0.058
–6.47
–0.53
9.72
3.60****
11.59
4.29****
12.39
2.22**
3.26
0.39
11.77
4.64****
12.23
8.11****
∆Imp –0.0047
–0.275
N
–0.003
–0.158
N
–0.0033
–0.24
N
–0.018
–0.62
N
0.026
2.37**
Y
0.029
2.58***
Y
0.024
2.39**
Y
0.028
2.19**
Y
∆Out 0.104
1.257
N
0.116
1.24
N
0.014
0.219
N
0.014
0.21
N
ShImp 0.0068
0.077
Y
0.064
0.699
Y
–0.23
–1.1
Y
∆ShImp 0.0027
0.22
Y
–0.039
–0.3
N
0.43
1.6*
N
ShExp –0.135
–1.938**
Y
0.12
0.68
N
RExp 0.031
2.05**
N
–0.058
–1.61*
Y
0.03
1.9***
N
–0.017
–1.08
Y
ShImpI 5.17
3.82****
A
4.04
2.68***
N
3.81
2.61***
A
2.56
1.44*
N
Emp 0.0025
5.51****
Y
0.0012
3.35****
Y
Loss 1.08
2.54***
Y
1.19
3.35****
Y
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Variant 1 Variant 2
PGH SISH LH FRH PGH SISH LH FRH
Debt –0.06
–0.64
N
–0.032
–0.36
N
NEnt 0.00067
5.23****
N
0.00063
6.668****
Y
0.0003
3.29****
N
0.00038
3.95****
Y
Sh4 –0.16
–1.52*
N
–0.28
–2.738***
Y
–0.3
–2.81****
N
–0.355
–3.252****
Y
  R2
 2aR
  F
0.746
0.677
10.79***
0.732
0.65
8.18***
0.84
0.796
19.21***
0.034
0.15
1.84
0.396
0.348
8.36***
0.4
0.34
6.68***
0.47
0.42
9.02***
0.174
0.126
3.65**
Notes.
Upper figure in a cell refers to the value of a regression coefficient,
lower figure refers to the value of t-statistic.
* — significant at the 90 per cent level;
** — significant at the 95 per cent level;
*** — significant at the 99 per cent level;
**** — significant at the 99.5 per cent level.
For the F-ratio, only 95 per cent and 99 per cent confidence levels are consid-
ered.
Y — the direction of impact of a variable corresponds to the expected one;
N — the direction of impact of a variable does not correspond to the expected
one;
A — predicted sign is ambiguous.
Abbreviations:
PGH— pressure group hypothesis;
SISH — stagnant industry support hypothesis;
LH — liberalization hypothesis;
FRH — foreign repercussions hypothesis.
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Table B3. Model for foreign trade with non-CIS countries, 1995.
Variant 1 Variant 2
PGH SISH LH FRH PGH SISH LH FRH
Y-inter-
cept
–6.92
–0.525
–6.14
–0.57
12.45
3.98****
11.98
2.61
11.88
0.725
14.52
1.51*
13.57
4.706****
112.56
5.66****
∆Imp 0.0009
0.288
Y
–5.2 E–05
–0.016
N
–0.0002
–0.057
N
0.007
1.015
Y
0.0033
0.903
Y
0.003
0.84
Y
0.003
0.804
Y
0.005
1.25
Y
∆Out 0.251
3.54****
N
0.22
3.056****
N
0.032
0.473
N
–0.014
–0.2
Y
ShImp 0.103
1.851**
Y
0.129
2.28***
Y
0.085
0.68
N
∆ShImp –0.032
–0.53
N
–0.039
–0.63
N
–0.1
–0.81
Y
ShExp –0.117
–1.64**
Y
–0.0064
–0.04
Y
RExp 0.047
2.17**
N
–0.04
–1.05
Y
0.018
0.937
N
–0.04
–2.36**
Y
ShImpI 5.05
2.03**
A
0.54
0.11
N
2.64
1.10
A
–1.36
–0.52
Y
Pri –0.015
–0.4
N
Emp 0.003
6.6****
Y
0.001
2.08**
Y
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Variant 1 Variant 2
PGH SISH LH FRH PGH SISH LH FRH
Loss 0.46
3.81****
Y
0.397
3.07****
Y
Debt –0.24
–1.84**
N
–0.18
–1.26
N
NEnt 0.00055
6.46****
N
0.00043
6.88****
Y
0.00025
2.375**
N
0.0002
3.50****
Y
Sh4 –0.15
–1.47*
N
–0.314
–2.77***
Y
–0.24
–1.96**
N
–0.314
–2.79****
Y
ShIn 0.37
0.64
N
0.32
0.36
A
0.57
0.74
N
0.62
1.02
A
  R2
 2aR
  F
0.856
0.799
14.92***
0.837
0.782
15.38***
0.81
0.765
16.21***
0.25
0.004
1.02
0.389
0.314
5.21***
0.34
0.28
5.36***
0.39
0.33
6.43***
0.15
0.08
2.25
Notes.
Upper figure in a cell refers to the value of a regression coefficient,
lower figure refers to the value of t-statistic.
* — significant at the 90 per cent level; ** — significant at the 95 per cent level;
*** — significant at the 99 per cent level; **** — significant at the 99.5 per cent
level.
For the F-ratio, only 95 per cent and 99 per cent confidence levels are consid-
ered.
Y — the direction of impact of a variable corresponds to the expected one;
N — the direction of impact of a variable does not correspond to the expected
one;
A — predicted sign is ambiguous.
Abbreviations:
PGH— pressure group hypothesis;
SISH — stagnant industry support hypothesis;
LH — liberalization hypothesis;
FRH — foreign repercussions hypothesis.
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Table B4. Model for total foreign trade, 1996.
Variant 1 Variant 2
PGH SISH LH FRH PGH SISH LH FRH
Y-inter-
cept
20.98
1.91**
–11.58
–0.98
13.42
5.73****
8.74
1.77**
32.87
3.489****
15.41
1.37*
17.49
6.71****
12.49
3.96****
∆Imp –0.03
–2.07**
N
–0.033
–2.23***
N
–0.023
–1.607*
N
–0.023
–0.898
N
–0.01
–0.88
N
–0.0097
–0.79
N
–0.012
–0.91
N
–0.011
–0.783
N
∆Out –0.036
–0.50
Y
–0.0044
–0.059
Y
–0.067
–1.30
Y
–0.0078
–1.48*
Y
ShImp 0.012
0.24
Y
0.037
0.76
Y
0.081
0.734
N
∆ShImp 0.029
0.21
Y
0.115
0.803
Y
–0.075
–0.321
Y
ShExp 0.0019
0.74
N
0.0038
0.64
N
RExp 0.009
0.58
N
–0.038
–1.25
Y
0.01
0.54
N
–0.045
–2.82****
Y
ShImpI 0.08
0.712
A
–2.05
–0.83
Y
1.09
0.584
A
–2.69
–1.42*
Y
Pri –0.091
–1.22
N
–0.04
–1.34*
N
Emp 0.0034
6.24****
Y
0.0013
2.4**
Y
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Variant 1 Variant 2
PGH SISH LH FRH PGH SISH LH FRH
Inv 5.39
2.2**
N
0.013
0.0046
N
Loss 0.42
5.07****
Y
0.33
3.35****
Y
Debt –0.109
–1.01
N
–0.227
–1.64*
N
NEnt 0.0003
6.702****
N
0.0003
5.95****
Y
0.00013
2.328**
N
0.00015
2.96****
Y
Sh4 –0.115
–1.21
N
–0.254
–2.95****
Y
–0.27
–2.6***
N
–0.366
–3.36****
Y
ShIn 0.94
1.5*
N
1.258
1.52*
A
0.538
0.76
N
0.93
1.39*
A
  R2
 2aR
  F
0.825
0.761
12.94***
0.824
0.76
12.9***
0.795
0.744
15.54***
0.496
0.226
2.25
0.439
0.372
6.53***
0.394
0.321
5.41***
0.39
0.329
6.45***
0.196
0.13
3.18**
Notes.
Upper figure in a cell refers to the value of a regression coefficient,
lower figure refers to the value of t-statistic.
* — significant at the 90 per cent level; ** — significant at the 95 per cent level;
*** — significant at the 99 per cent level; **** — significant at the 99.5 per cent
level.
For the F-ratio, only 95 per cent and 99 per cent confidence levels are consid-
ered.
Y — the direction of impact of a variable corresponds to the expected one;
N — the direction of impact of a variable does not correspond to the expected
one;
A — predicted sign is ambiguous.
Abbreviations:
PGH— pressure group hypothesis;
SISH — stagnant industry support hypothesis;
LH — liberalization hypothesis;
FRH — foreign repercussions hypothesis.
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Table B5. Model for trade with non-CIS countries, 1996.
Variant 1 Variant 2
PGH SISH LH FRH PGH SISH LH FRH
Y-inter-
cept
17.25
1.57*
–13.29
–1.17
11.44
5.27****
9.67
2.12**
32.49
3.4****
15.33
1.36*
17.37
6.796****
12.02
3.86****
∆Imp –0.031
–2.009**
N
–0.025
–1.51*
N
–0.036
–2.56**
N
0.009
0.27
Y
–0.0099
–0.558
N
–0.0009
–0.05
N
–0.0098
–0.55
N
0.0039
0.2
Y
∆Out –0.0085
–0.151
Y
0.011
0.18
N
–0.067
–1.28
Y
–0.078
–1.48*
Y
ShImp 0.066
1.45*
Y
0.09
1.96**
Y
0.097
0.67
N
∆ShImp –0.071
–0.53
N
0.018
0.127
Y
–0.177
–0.52
Y
ShEx 0.015
0.68
N
0.019
0.27
N
RExp 0.0067
0.54
N
–0.038
–1.25
Y
–0.0024
–0.142
Y
–0.048
–3.5****
Y
ShImpI 2.55
1.69*
A
0.32
0.1
N
–0.92
–0.051
A
–2.25
–1.18**
Y
Pri –0.091
–1.30
N
–0.104
–1.34*
N
Emp 0.0036
6.696****
Y
0.0014
2.67***
Y
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Variant 1 Variant 2
PGH SISH LH FRH PGH SISH LH FRH
Inv 5.29
2.08**
N
0.084
0.031
N
Loss 0.38
4.75****
Y
0.337
3.39****
Y
Debt –0.09
–0.84
N
–0.24
–1.73**
N
NEnt 0.00033
7.104****
N
0.00033
7.12****
Y
0.00014
2.56***
N
0.00014
2.72***
Y
Sh4 –0.12
–1.34*
N
–0.244
–3.23****
Y
–0.28
–2.61***
N
–0.33
–3.10****
Y
ShIn 0.87
1.52*
N
0.75
0.873
A
0.558
0.785
N
0.87
1.31*
A
  R2
 2aR
  F
0.850
0.795
15.56***
0.825
0.76
13.01***
0.828
0.785
19.25***
0.37
0.18
1.96
0.435
0.367
6.40***
0.386
0.313
5.25***
0.379
0.318
6.22***
0.21
0.15
3.47**
Notes.
Upper figure in a cell refers to the value of a regression coefficient,
lower figure refers to the value of t-statistic.
* — significant at the 90 per cent level; ** — significant at the 95 per cent level;
*** — significant at the 99 per cent level; **** — significant at the 99.5 per cent
level.
For the F-ratio, only 95 per cent and 99 per cent confidence levels are consid-
ered.
Y — the direction of impact of a variable corresponds to the expected one;
N — the direction of impact of a variable does not correspond to the expected
one;
A — predicted sign is ambiguous.
Abbreviations:
PGH— pressure group hypothesis;
SISH — stagnant industry support hypothesis;
LH — liberalization hypothesis;
FRH — foreign repercussions hypothesis.
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Table B6. Model for total foreign trade, 1997.
Variant 1 Variant 2
PGH SISH LH FRH PGH SISH LH FRH
Y-inter-
cept
15.86
0.475
13.77
1.166
14.07
4.87****
16.71
3.759****
33.85
0.85
27.86
2.425***
16.18
6.77****
14.78
5.03****
∆Imp 0.014
0.604
Y
0.02
0.93
Y
0.009
0.38
Y
0.61
1.479*
Y
0.021
0.911
Y
0.021
0.99
Y
0.009
0.39
Y
0.034
1.298*
Y
∆Out –0.041
–0.54
Y
–0.087
–1.071
Y
–0.06
–1.303*
Y
–0.06
–1.30*
Y
ShImp 0.004
0.16
Y
0.019
0.71
Y
–0.02
–0.68
Y
∆ShImp –0.11
–0.93
Y
ShExp –0.083
–1.295
Y
–0.032
–1.06
Y
RExp 0.03
1.62*
N
–2.42
–0.935
Y
0.0097
0.52
N
–0.043
–2.8****
Y
ShImpI 1.5
0.981
A
–2.42
–0.935
A
1.034
0.58
A
–2.47
–1.34*
Y
Pri 0.011
0.034
Y
–0.064
–0.174
N
Emp 0.0034
5.12****
Y
0.0015
2.65***
Y
Inv –0.91
–0.21
N
–6.0
–1.88**
Y
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Variant 1 Variant 2
PGH SISH LH FRH PGH SISH LH FRH
Loss 0.312
3.12****
Y
1.315
3.0****
Y
Debt –0.23
–1.62*
N
–0.39
–3.1****
N
NEnt 0.0003
3.2****
N
0.0003
6.39****
Y
0.0001
1.429*
N
0.00016
3.2****
Y
Sh4 –0.197
–1.135
N
–0.26
–3.1****
Y
–0.366
–2.6****
N
–0.33
–3.1****
Y
ShIn –0.17
–0.216
0.27
0.405
A
–0.49
–0.73
N
0.17
0.37
A
  R2
 2aR
  F
0.76
0.69
10.47***
0.754
0.679
10.08***
0.786
0.733
14.73***
0.29
0.108
1.61
0.405
0.33
5.67***
0.412
0.34
5.84***
0.379
0.318
6.24***
0.169
0.105
2.65**
Notes.
Upper figure in a cell refers to the value of a regression coefficient,
lower figure refers to the value of t-statistic.
* — significant at the 90 per cent level; ** — significant at the 95 per cent level;
*** — significant at the 99 per cent level; **** — significant at the 99.5 per cent
level.
For the F-ratio, only 95 per cent and 99 per cent confidence levels are consid-
ered.
Y — the direction of impact of a variable corresponds to the expected one;
N — the direction of impact of a variable does not correspond to the expected
one;
A — predicted sign is ambiguous.
Abbreviations:
PGH— pressure group hypothesis;
SISH — stagnant industry support hypothesis;
LH — liberalization hypothesis;
FRH — foreign repercussions hypothesis.
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Table B7. Model for trade with non-CIS countries, 1997.
Variant 1 Variant 2
PGH SISH LH FRH PGH SISH LH FRH
Y-inter-
cept
24.11
0.72
–9.73
–0.67
11.13
4.92****
10.34
2.48**
37.25
0.96
26.42
2.288**
16.40
6.647****
14.00
4.89****
∆Imp 0.01
0.41
Y
0.019
0.904
Y
–0.019
–1.19
N
0.025
0.69
Y
0.005
0.29
Y
0.008
0.509
Y
0.00025
0.015
Y
0.0047
0.258
Y
∆Out 0.0073
0.129
N
0.014
0.258
N
–0.053
–1.16
Y
–0.052
–1.15
Y
ShImp 0.064
1.54*
Y
0.102
2.302**
Y
0.015
1.177
N
∆ShImp –0.198
–1.08
N
–0.22
–1.48*
N
–0.27
–1.19
Y
ShExp 0.00002
0.79
N
0.000067
1.43*
N
RExp 0.01
0.77
N
–0.039
–1.62*
Y
–0.006
–0.365
Y
–0.048
–3.58****
Y
ShImpI 2.72
1.966**
A
1.685
0.67
N
–0.09
–0.056
A
–1.60
–0.92
Y
Pri –0.24
–0.68
N
–0.104
–0.28
N
Emp 0.0037
6.158****
Y
0.0015
2.776****
Y
Inv 4.28
1.01
N
–6.16
–1.93**
Y
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Variant 1 Variant 2
PGH SISH LH FRH PGH SISH LH FRH
Loss 0.36
3.929****
Y
0.33
3.16****
Y
Debt –0.15
–1.14
N
–0.38
–3.03****
N
NEnt 0.00036
3.99****
N
0.0003
6.167****
Y
0.00013
1.596*
N
0.00014
2.699****
Y
Sh4 0.048
0.228
Y
–0.207
–2.64***
Y
–0.37
–2.66***
N
–0.28
–2.80****
Y
ShIn 1.0
0.99
N
0.49
0.74
A
–0.48
–0.69
Y
0.22
0.45
A
 R2
2
aR
 F
0.789
0.712
10.30***
0.803
0.732
11.22***
0.798
0.747
15.77***
0.42
0.24
2.36
0.396
0.325
5.45***
0.404
0.332
5.64***
0.371
0.31
6.02***
0.21
0.15
3.37**
Notes.
Upper figure in a cell refers to the value of a regression coefficient,
lower figure refers to the value of t-statistic.
* — significant at the 90 per cent level; ** — significant at the 95 per cent level;
*** — significant at the 99 per cent level; **** — significant at the 99.5 per cent
level.
For the F-ratio, only 95 per cent and 99 per cent confidence levels are consid-
ered.
Y — the direction of impact of a variable corresponds to the expected one;
N — the direction of impact of a variable does not correspond to the expected
one;
A — predicted sign is ambiguous.
Abbreviations:
PGH— pressure group hypothesis;
SISH — stagnant industry support hypothesis;
LH — liberalization hypothesis;
FRH — foreign repercussions hypothesis.
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C. Results of Testing "Ideal" Regression Models
Table C1. Ideal Regression Models, Variant 1.
Model for trade with non-CIS countries Model for total
foreign trade
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1996 1997
 Y-intercept  –27.16
 –3.227****
 –11.37
 –1.93**
  –20.89
  –3.45****
 –6.07
 –2.01**
 –3.71
 –0.68
 –5.97
 –1.68*
 3.54
 0.51
 ∆Imp  –0.027
 –1.87**
 –0.027
 –1.82**
 ∆Out  0.104
 1.65*
 0.114
 1.79**
  0.22
  3.37****
 –0.048
 –1.051
 ShImp   0.083
  1.65*
 0.045
 1.49*
 0.65
 2.15**
 0.04
 1.51*
 ShImpI  3.24
 2.67***
 4.11
 3.28****
  3.34
  1.91**
 3.69
 2.33**
 2.60
 1.95**
 2.31
 1.49*
 2.681
 1.91**
 Emp  0.0011
 3.48****
 0.0023
 7.2****
  0.0003
  7.26****
 0.003
 7.06****
 0.0034
 7.47****
 0.0027
 5.69****
 0.0037
 7.765****
 Loss  1.48
 4.65****
 1.23
 4.46****
  0.518
  4.94****
 0.3
 4.55****
 0.356
 4.74****
 0.33
 4.38****
 0.40
 4.59****
 Debt  0.24
 3.38****
 –0.14
 –1.57*
 –0.226
 –2.54***
 R2  0.694  0.803  0.834  0.803  0.808  0.774  0.768
2
aR
 0.628  0.771  0.798  0.764  0.769  0.728  0.722
 F  10.44  24.53  23.19  20.39  21.03  17.08  16.60
Upper figure in a cell refers to the value of a regression coefficient,
lower figure refers to the value of t-statistic.
* — significant at the 90 per cent level;
** — significant at the 95 per cent level;
*** — significant at the 99 per cent level;
**** — significant at the 99.5 per cent level.
The F-ratio is always significant at the 99 per cent confidence level.
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Table C2. Ideal Regression Models, Variant 2.
Model for trade with non-CIS countries
Model for total
foreign trade
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1996 1997
  Y-intercept   –10.98
  –1.69**
 1.48
 0.65
 2.12
 0.74
 –2.74
 –0.69
 21.27
 2.06**
 –5.02
 –1.14
 24.43
 2.14**
  ∆Out  0.028
 2.696***
 –0.056
 –1.28
  ShImpI   1.37
  0.92
 2.73
 2.06**
 2.3
 1.22
 1.73
 1.06
 2.72
 1.55*
 2.38
 1.55*
  Emp   0.0005
  1.48*
 0.0012
 3.57****
 0.001
 2.84****
 0.0015
 3.384****
 0.0017
 3.16****
 0.0016
 3.58****
 0.0016
 3.0****
  Inv  –6.19
 –1.95**
 –6.54
 –2.08**
  Loss   1.14
  3.08****
 1.17
 3.99****
 0.44
 3.53****
 0.328
 4.02****
 0.34
 3.32****
 0.36
 4.26****
 0.36
 3.48****
  Debt   0.19
  2.055**
 –0.39
 –3.167****
 –0.38
 –3.13****
    R2   0.21  0.444  0.33  0.331  0.386  0.347  0.428
   2aR   0.15  0.401  0.29  0.293  0.338  0.309  0.36
    F   3.50  10.20  8.55  8.74  8.16  9.37  6.23
Upper figure in a cell refers to the value of a regression coefficient,
lower figure refers to the value of t-statistic.
* — significant at the 90 per cent level;
** — significant at the 95 per cent level;
*** — significant at the 99 per cent level;
**** — significant at the 99.5 per cent level.
The F-ratio is always significant at the 99 per cent confidence level.
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Table C3. Ideal Regression Models, Variant 3.
Model for trade with non-CIS countries
Model for total
foreign trade
1993 1994 1995 1996a 1997a 1996 1997
 Y-intercept   –12.31
  –2.44***
  1.26
  0.55
  1.31
  0.498
  –1.69
  –0.43
  21.58
  2.03**
  –2.08
  –0.49
  21.47
  2.39**
 ∆Imp   0.026
  1.77**
 ShImpI   1.17
  1.22
  2.86
  2.35**
  0.96
  0.8
  1.25
  0.98
  1.504
  1.34*
  1.75
  1.31*
  1.97
  1.59*
 Emp   0.0003
  1.32*
  0.0009
  2.96****
  0.0015
  1.77**
  0.0011
  2.88****
  0.0012
  2.81****
  0.0012
  3.21****
  0.0012
  2.62***
 Inv   –7.5
  –2.81****
  –7.71
  –2.96****
 Loss   1.34
  4.84****
  1.034
  3.55****
  0.5
  4.28****
  0.289
  3.69****
  0.31
  3.28****
  0.28
  3.48****
  0.32
  3.33****
 Debt   0.19
  2.68****
  –0.38
  –2.93****
  –0.39
  –3.1****
 R2   0.238   0.23   0.2   0.18   0.236   0.16   0.28
2
aR
  0.206   0.209   0.178   0.145   0.195   0.134   0.237
 F   7.36   9.62   8.11   5.20   5.81   6.11   6.13
Upper figure in a cell refers to the value of a regression coefficient,
lower figure refers to the value of t-statistic.
* — significant at the 90 per cent level;
** — significant at the 95 per cent level;
*** — significant at the 99 per cent level;
**** — significant at the 99.5 per cent level.
The F-ratio is always significant at the 99 per cent confidence level.
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D. Results of Testing Panel Data Models
Table D1. Regressions with Pooled Data and Year Dummies for Ideal Models.
Model for trade with non-CIS
countries, 1993–1997
Model for total foreign trade,
1996–1997
Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3 Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3
  Y-intercept   –9.46
  –1.869**
  15.09
  2.666****
  13.61
  2.898****
  0.13
  0.032
  10.80
  1.501*
  20.25
  3.034****
  ∆Imp   –0.001
  –0.324
  –0.018
  –1.625*
  0.0026
  0.329
  ∆Out   0.0346
  1.084
  –0.029
  –1.168
  ShImp   0.046
  1.944**
  0.0065
  0.501
  ShImpI   3.19
  4.226****
  1.49
  2.132**
  1.576
  3.028****
  2.775
  2.691***
  2.325
  2.032**
  2.236
  2.543***
  Emp   0.0022
  11.548****
  0.00081
  4.068****
  0.00053
  3.376****
  0.0035
  11.115****
  0.0018
  5.099****
  0.0013
  4.335****
  Inv   –2.128
  –3.802****
  –2.162
  –4.143****
  –3.211
  –1.609*
  –6.076
  –3.513****
  Loss   0.398
  7.092****
  0.314
  5.413****
  0.2728
  5.288****
  0.3866
  6.770****
  0.3713
  5.246****
  0.287
  4.582****
  Debt   –0.0746
  –1.861**
  –0.236
  –4.047****
  –0.242
  –4.523****
  –0.228
  –3.430****
  –0.296
  –3.340****
  –0.367
  –3.916****
  D_1993   7.803
  2.868****
  8.221
  3.000****
  7.767
  3.310****
  D_1994   13.53
  4.972****
  13.578
  4.954****
  11.83
  5.041****
  D_1995   10.74
  4.505****
  8.552
  3.806****
  7.85
  4.388****
  D_1996   2.018
  1.317*
  0.2882
  0.192
  0.322
  0.263
  0.97
  0.765
  0.7224
  0.547
  0.336
  0.286
  R2   0.706   0.361   0.235   0.763   0.383   0.231
 2aR
  0.682   0.337   0.220   0.732   0.348   0.203
  F   29.05   15.20   16.51   24.84   11.07   8.23
Upper figure in a cell refers to the value of a regression coefficient, lower figure
refers to the value of t-statistic.
* — significant at the 90 per cent level; ** — significant at the 95 per cent level;
*** — significant at the 99 per cent level; **** — significant at the 99.5 per cent
level.
The F-ratio is always significant at the 99 per cent confidence level.
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Table D2. GLS Random-Effects Regressions with Pooled Data for Ideal Models.
Model for trade with non-CIS
countries, 1993–1997
Model for total foreign trade,
1996–1997
Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3 Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3
  Y-intercept  –0.443
 –0.102
 22.42
 4.254****
 20.42
 4.673****
 1.521
 0.417
 11.69
 1.671*
 20.74
 3.220****
  ∆Imp  –0.00021
 –0.067
 –0.017
 –1.522
 0.0025
 0.327
  ∆Out  0.0233
 0.734
 –0.036
 –1.484
  ShImp  0.043
 1.805*
 0.0073
 0.570
  ShImpI  3.106
 4.087****
 1.521
 2.166**
 1.528
 2.921***
 2.63
 2.604***
 2.28
 2.004**
 2.221258
 2.537**
  Emp  0.0023
 11.568****
 0.00082
 4.118****
 0.00053
 3.398****
 0.0036
 11.209****
 0.0018
 5.141****
 0.0013
 4.362****
  Inv  2.008
 –3.580****
 –2.075
 –3.967****
 –3.201
 –1.609
 –6.08
 –3.525****
  Loss  0.340
 6.756****
 0.249
 4.773****
 0.198
 4.436****
 0.376
 6.815****
 0.366
 5.236****
 0.285
 4.589****
  Debt  –0.073
 –1.808*
 –0.22
 –3.798****
 –0.234
 –4.356****
 –0.237
 –3.634****
 –0.302
 –3.454****
 –0.371
 –4.033****
  R2:
      within
      between
      overall
  chi2
 0.676
 0.433
 0.561
 272.24
 0.301
 0.505
 0.242
 111.26
 0.180
 0.623
 0.161
 101.31
 0.763
 1.0?
 0.761
 174.60
 0.383
 1.0?
 0.381
 66.54
 0.231
 1.0?
 0.2304
 57.78
  Hausman
  test:
  chi2
  P > chi2
 5.48
 0.6015
 6.58
 0.3619
 8.37
 0.1368
 0.56
 0.9971
 0.27
 0.9981
 0.08
 1.00
Upper figure in a cell refers to the value of regression coefficient, lower figure
refers to the value of z-statistic.
* — significant at the 90 per cent level; ** — significant at the 95 per cent level;
*** — significant at the 99 per cent level; **** — significant at the 99.5 per cent
level.
The chi2 statistic in regression models is always significant at the 99.5 per cent
confidence level.
? —No tariff changes in 1996–1997 for commodity types included in our data-
base.   
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